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Recent investigations have suggested that the use of emotion-avoidance or emotion- 
suppression strategies to cope with anxiety contributes to the development and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders, and that substituting these strategies with emotional 
acceptance can lead to effective symptom reduction. We wished to consider whether 
attempts to suppress the negative emotions associated with exposure therapy would serve 
to impede emotional processing and symptom reduction, and conversely, whether 
acceptance of these emotions would augment treatment efficacy. Fifty-nine participants 
displaying marked claustrophobic fear were assigned to receive 30 minutes of exposure 
(enclosure in a small chamber) while receiving, A) instructions to accept and allow the 
experience of unpleasant emotions (ACC), B) instructions to control and suppress the 
experience of unpleasant emotions (SUP), or C) no instructions regarding emotion 
regulation (exposure only; EO). Outcome assessments were conducted prior to 
treatment, immediately following treatment, and at one-month follow-up, and included 
fear and heart rate reactivity in response to a behavioral approach test. We predicted that 
ACC participants would display greater reductions in claustrophobic fear than EO 
participants, and that EO participants would in turn display greater reductions in 
claustrophobic fear than SUP participants. These hypotheses were not supported. In 
addition, a detailed analysis of treatment process data was conducted. Peak fear ratings, 
claustrophobic threat expectancies, self-efficacy, and acceptance of anxiety were 
collected over the course of the treatment session, and hierarchical linear modeling 
(HLM)  was  used  to  produce  individual  growth  curves  for  these  variables.    Three 
?  
hypotheses were formulated: 1) ACC participants would display a more rapid 
improvement in these measures than SUP and EO participants, 2) threat expectancies, 
self-efficacy and anxiety would mediate reductions in fear over the course of treatment, 
and 3) mediational pathways would be moderated by treatment condition. Though no 
support was found for our first process hypothesis, treatment specific mediation was 
found. Among ACC participants, self-efficacy and suffocation expectancies mediated the 
session-fear relationship, and among EO participants, entrapment expectancies mediated 
this relationship.   Among SUP participants, no significant mediators were identified. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
Anxiety disorders are among the most prevalent and costly of mental disorders. 
They are also the most successfully treated class of disorders. Efforts to develop and 
refine anxiety treatments have profited greatly from advances in our understanding of 
basic mechanisms of fear reduction. Achieving such an understanding is important 
because even though anxiety disorders are topographically heterogeneous, they all 
involve 1) an excessive and maladaptive degree of fearful or anxious responding to 
internal or external stimuli and 2) excessive or rigid attempts to manage anxiety by 
avoiding those stimuli. Therefore, treatments of all anxiety disorders can be improved by 
understanding the processes of fear reduction and emotion regulation. 
Research on the mechanisms of fear reduction has culminated in the development 
and testing of emotional processing theories. These theories attempt to explain why 
exposure therapy is effective at reducing fear and other symptoms of emotional 
disturbance, and they predict factors that can affect the potency of exposure therapy. 
Fear reduction studies have been used to test specific predictions of emotional processing 
theories, such as their prediction that distraction can interfere with emotional processing, 
and that increased focus on the phobic stimulus and one’s own emotional response can 
enhance emotional processing. Fear reduction studies have been an especially useful tool 
for theory testing because exposure to a phobic stimulus represents a powerful, 
ecologically valid emotion manipulation, which can be carefully dosed and 
parametrically altered. 
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For these same reasons, fear reduction paradigms may be useful in the study of 
emotion regulation strategies. Recent research has explored the emotional and cognitive 
consequences of various emotional regulation strategies, including emotion-control 
strategies (e.g. thought suppression, expressive suppression, and inhibition of anxious 
symptoms) and emotional-acceptance strategies. Emotion-control strategies have been 
found to be cognitively demanding and ineffective at reducing the subjective experience 
of unpleasant emotions, and may even intensify the experience of those  emotions, 
whereas emotion-acceptance strategies may paradoxically reduce the intensity of these 
emotions. 
These findings are often used to justify acceptance-based therapeutic 
interventions, which are grounded in the idea that the inflexible and inappropriate use of 
avoidant emotion-control strategies acts as a causal and maintaining factor of 
pathological fear and anxiety. While most experimental comparisons of emotion-control 
and emotion-acceptance strategies have measured their effects on subjective and 
physiological emotional responding, few studies have considered their effects on 
emotional processing.  Because emotion-control strategies appear to be cognitively 
demanding, the use of such strategies may impair emotional processing, thereby 
maintaining anxious and fearful responding. 
In order to test whether emotion-control or -acceptance strategies would 
differentially affect emotional processing, we assigned participants with claustrophobia to 
undergo exposure while using one of three emotion regulation strategies: emotion 
control, emotion acceptance, or no particular strategy. We then compared whether the 
experimentally-assigned  strategies  differentially  affected  emotional  processing,  as 
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indexed by subjective, physiological, and behavioral measures of fear. We expected that, 
 
1) over the course of the exposure therapy procedure, the emotion-acceptance group 
would display greater initial  fear activation  and more rapid  fear reduction  than the 
exposure-only and control conditions, and that 2) from pre-treatment to post-treatment 
and follow-up, the emotion-acceptance group would show greater and more durable 
reductions in fear than the exposure-only and control conditions. 
In addition to assessing the degree to which emotion regulation strategies would 
affect emotional processing, we also wished to consider their effects on the mechanisms 
of fear reduction. Specifically, we were interested in whether reductions in fear were 
mediated by changes in cognition. Over the course of the exposure session, we measured 
several cognitive variables: threat expectancies, self-efficacy, and acceptance of anxiety. 
We then used individual growth-curve modeling to conduct a micro-analysis of these 
variables during the session, and to examine their relationship to fear decline. We 
expected that, 1) each of these cognitive variables would significantly mediate the 
relationship between exposure and fear, 2) acceptance of anxiety would account for the 
largest proportion of that mediational relationship (across all conditions), and 3) these 
mediational relationships would be moderated by treatment condition (such that 
acceptance of anxiety would demonstrate mediation most strongly for the emotional 
acceptance condition, whereas self-efficacy would most strongly mediate the relationship 
for those in the suppression condition). 
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1.2 Anxiety Disorders 
 
1.2.1   The Scope of the Problem 
 
Anxiety disorders are the most prevalent class of mental disorders. According to 
the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005), 
anxiety disorders were found to affect 18.1% of the study’s 9282 randomly sampled 
American respondents—far more than mood disorders (9.5% of respondents), impulse 
control disorders (8.9%), and substance disorders (3.8%). The twelve-month prevalence 
rates of specific anxiety disorders varied greatly, ranging from 1% of  respondents 
meeting criteria for obsessive compulsive disorder to 8.7% meeting criteria for specific 
phobia. 
In addition to being highly prevalent, anxiety disorders are debilitating and costly. 
Those suffering from clinically diagnosable or even subthreshold anxiety disorders report 
significant impairments in functioning and quality of life (Mendlowicz & Stein, 2000). 
They may devote an enormous share of their time and energy to managing their anxiety, 
and they often restrict their range of social and occupational activities and goals in an 
attempt to avoid the fear and distress inherent in these disorders. This functional 
impairment has a real economic cost. Using data from the National Comorbidity Study 
(Kessler, 2002), Greenberg and colleagues (1999) calculated anxiety disorders to cost 
42.3 billion dollars annually, though Telch, Smits, Brown, and Beckner (2002) suggested 
that this figure underestimates the true cost since it omits the cost of obsessive- 
compulsive disorder (OCD). Moreover, anxiety sufferers overutilize non-psychiatric 
medical services. For example, the treatment of panic disorder was found to lead to a 
94% medical cost offset (Salvador-Carulla, Segui, Fernandez-Cano, & Canet, 1995). 
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1.2.2 Treatment Efficacy 
 
Fortunately, anxiety disorders are highly treatable. According to a review of 
panic disorder treatment trials by Craske and Barlow (2001), rates of participants without 
panic at posttreatment and 2-year follow-up were 76% and 78%, respectively. Moreover, 
panic disorder treatment has been found to significantly improve quality of life (Telch, 
Schmidt, Jaimez, Jacquin, & Harrington, 1995). Treatments for specific phobia have 
been similarly efficacious. In a recent meta-analysis of psychosocial treatment trials for 
specific phobia (Wolitzky, Horowitz, Powers, & Telch, in press), treatment response 
rates, rates ranged from 40% (Ost, Fellenius, & Sterner, 1991) to 94% (Powers, Smits, & 
Telch, 2004), with an average of 76% of participants responding to  the  treatment. 
Perhaps the anxiety disorder which has been most resistant to treatment has been 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Wells, 2002; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002). However, 
even treatments for GAD have been moderately successful, producing treatment response 
rates between 40% (Fisher & Durham, 1999) and 77% (Ladouceuer, Dugas, Freeston, 
Léger, Gagnon, & Thibodeau, 2000). 
Although a considerable variety of treatments, targets, and samples have been 
examined in the anxiety disorder literature, psychosocial treatments have been generally 
found to produce treatment gains equal to or better than pharmacotherapy in the short 
term (Otto, Smits, & Reese, 2005), and there is considerable evidence that cognitive- 
behavioral therapy (CBT) treatment gains are better maintained after treatment 
discontinuation than those produced by pharmacotherapy (Hollon, Stewart, & Strunk, 
2006; Roth & Fonagy, 2005). Though their specific mechanisms of action are 
heterogeneous, anxiolytic medications reduce anxious responding via the regulation of 
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neurotransmitters (Mitte, 2005). When these treatments are discontinued, anxiety 
symptoms often return (Liebowitz, 1998). In contrast, CBT approaches involve 
educating clients about the nature of anxiety, teaching clients to challenge their anxiety- 
provoking cognitions, and utilizing behavioral exposure exercises, all of which serve to 
bring about behavioral changes that persist after treatment discontinuation. 
1.2.3 Mechanisms of Change 
 
One reason for such success in developing and refining CBT for anxiety is that 
researchers have invested considerable effort in understanding the mechanisms of change 
underlying therapeutic gains. Outcome research is useful, but mechanism research is 
equally, if not more, useful in the long run (Borkovec & Castonguay, 1998), for several 
reasons. For one, there has been a proliferation of multi-componential anxiety treatment 
packages, many of which share some overlapping features. Determining the relative 
efficacy of all available treatment packages would be highly impractical, if not 
impossible. As Bandura wrote, “Without…knowledge [of mechanisms of change], the 
search for effective [therapeutic] methods reduces to a fortuitous process of trial and error 
in which failures typically far exceed successes” (1978). Moreover, different treatments 
may contain elements that are superficially distinct but functionally equivalent. Refining 
treatments involves not just identifying active and inert treatment components, but 
understanding how those components function (Doss, 2004). As Kazdin so eloquently 
put it, “The focus on mediators or mechanisms represents a deeper level of 
understanding…because this means we know how the problem unfolds, through what 
processes, and the ways in which one variable leads to another.” (1999) 
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Though anxiety disorders display topographical heterogeneity, they all share two 
at least two common elements: 1) abnormal anxious responding to external or internal 
stimuli (Telch et al., 2002) and 2) reflexive attempts to avoid those stimuli (Eifert and 
Forsyth, 2005). Therefore, the general behavioral therapy (BT) approach to treating all 
anxiety disorders involves 1) the  identification of the  anxiety-provoking internal or 
external cues, and 2) structured exposure to those cues, which brings about a reduction in 
anxious responding. In cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT), this procedure is augmented 
by the correction of faulty beliefs about the threatening stimuli (Beck & Emery, 1985). 
In cases of specific phobia, this procedure is relatively straightforward, since the anxiety- 
provoking stimulus is circumscribed and clearly identifiable. In other anxiety disorders, 
the anxiety-provoking stimulus is less readily apparent. In panic  disorder, unusual 
interoceptive body sensations may lead to panic attacks (Bouton, Mineka, & Barlow, 
2001), whereas in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), intrusive memories of a 
traumatic event may provoke acute anxiety (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). In any case, 
cognitive restructuring and behavioral exposure can reliably and effectively reduce 
symptoms (Butler, Chapman, Forman, & Beck, 2006; Clark, 1999; Barlow, Esler, & 
Vitali, 1998), and these procedures’ efficacy may depend on the way in which they are 
delivered (Wells, Clark & Salkovskis, 1995; Ost, Ferebee, & Furmark, 1997). Thus, a 
good understanding of the mechanisms of fear reduction can lead to improvements in 
treatments for all anxiety disorders. 
1.3 Fear Reduction 
 
Fear is widely recognized to be an adaptive emotion, enabling an organism to 
rapidly  respond  to  environmental  threats  (Damasio,  1994).    But  fear  can  also  be 
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problematic. Psychologists have long attempted to understand the etiology  of 
pathological fear and to produce effective methods of treatment. From early on, it was 
clear that exposure therapy provided a reliable way to reduce fear and anxiety. However, 
the mechanisms underlying exposure therapy are still not fully understood. 
1.3.1 Behavioral Models of Fear Reduction 
 
Initial attempts to understand fear reduction were based largely on early models of 
fear acquisition and maintenance that were grounded in theories of classical conditioning 
(Pavlov, 1928; Watson & Rayner, 1920). These theories posited that individuals acquire 
phobias via the same associative learning processes observed in laboratory animals. 
According to these models, a traumatic experience involving the phobic object may lead 
to the acquisition of a conditioned fear response, which then generalizes to related 
objects. Mowrer’s two-factor theory (1960) combined elements of classical and operant 
conditioning, suggesting that fears are acquired via associative learning but maintained 
via operant learning. Mowrer conceived of phobic avoidance as an operant behavior that 
is maintained by negative reinforcement (the resultant reduction of anxiety), which 
reduces the occurrence of future exposure to the feared stimulus. 
Because these  theories were  developed from behavioral models that did not 
recognize cognitive mediation, they credited fear reduction to automatic nonconscious 
processes. Decreases in anxious responding that occur during exposure were thought to 
represent habituation - the automatic reduction of responding to repeated stimuli – or 
extinction, in cases in which the fear was initially conditioned (Mackintosh, 1987; Marks, 
2000). 
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1.3.2 Cognitive-Behavioral Models of Fear Reduction 
 
Though influential and useful, purely behavioral accounts proved insufficient in 
several ways. For one, they required contiguity (the concurrent pairing of UCS and CS), 
in the form of a traumatic learning event involving the phobic target. Comparisons of 
phobic and non-phobic individuals, however, often failed to demonstrate that phobia 
sufferers had a history of more frequent contact with the phobic target (Menzies & 
Clarke, 1994; Menzies, Kirby, & Harris, 1998), and even suggested that phobia sufferers 
may have had fewer contact experiences than non-phobic individuals (Poulton, Davies, 
Menzies, Langley, & Silva, 1998). Moreover, these theories failed to answer some 
important questions about fear reduction, such as why it could be accomplished via 
techniques in which habituation or extinction were not expected to occur, e.g,, flooding, 
modeling, and cognitive restructuring (Marks, 1987; Rachman, 1990). To account for 
these phenomena, researchers developed cognitive mediation models, in which the fear 
response is contingent upon the appraisal of the phobic object as threatening. According 
to Smith and Lazarus (1993, p. 94), an appraisal is “an evaluation of what one’s 
relationship to the environment implies for personal well-being.” Exposure was thought 
to be one method, albeit a powerful one, that would lead to changes in appraisals, thereby 
leading to reductions in fear. The specific nature and content of these appraisals differed 
from theory to theory. 
Neo-conditioning theories, (Rachman, 1991; Rescorla, 1988) sought to explain 
the acquisition and maintenance of phobic behaviors by examining cognitive processes, 
such as memory and expectation of the unconditioned stimulus (UCS) and the 
conditioned  stimulus  (CS).    These  theories  jettisoned  the  classical  assumption  that 
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contiguous pairing of the UCS and the CS were necessary (Menzies & Parker, 1999; 
Poulton & Menzies, 2002) for conditioning to occur. Rather, the CS need only be 
appraised as predictive of the UCS. This accounted for the acquisition of a phobia in the 
absence of a conditioning event, and for how flooding and modeling could bring about 
reductions in fear. Its inclusion of cognitive representations of the feared stimuli also 
opened the door to theories of emotional processing. 
Whereas neo-conditioning theorists investigated the role  of appraisals of the 
phobic stimulus, Bandura focused on appraisals of coping with potential threat. 
According to Bandura’s (1988, 1986) self-efficacy model, the fear response is determined 
not only by situational threat appraisals, but by a perceived inability to cope with the 
aversive cognitions and emotions that arise in response to the threat. Fear reduction is 
thought to result from changing appraisals of coping self-efficacy. Enhancement of one’s 
sense of mastery to cope with potential threat leads to a corresponding reduction in fear. 
One powerful method of increasing self-efficacy is via enactive attainment, the 
experience of mastering a difficult task. Therapeutic exposure is thought to represent 
such an experience, in that the confrontation with the feared stimulus leads to an increase 
in perceived ability to handle the situation, thereby leading to a reduction in fear. This 
theory has received considerable empirical support (Valentiner, Telch, Petruzzi, & Bolte, 
1996; Bandura, Reese, & Adams, 1982). 
1.3.3 Emotional Processing Models of Fear Reduction 
 
In researching traumatic stress and obsessive-compulsive disorder, Rachman 
(1980) noticed that exposure to trauma-related cues led to reductions in an array of 
symptoms,  such  as  obsessions,  nightmares,  phobias,  and  grief  reactions.    He  also 
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observed that these symptoms sometimes returned spontaneously after an initial reduction 
To account for these observations, he introduced the concept of emotional processing 
(1978; 2001), which he defined as “a process whereby emotional disturbances are 
absorbed and decline to the extent that other experiences and behavior can proceed 
without disruption” (1980, p. 51). He proposed that such processing would be facilitated 
by a direct experiencing of the emotional disturbance at a moderate level. 
To avoid circularity in his definition of emotional processing, Rachman suggested 
that the degree of successful emotional processing could be measured via the use of 
response probes, in which the therapist “[presents]  relevant stimulus material in an 
attempt to re-evoke the emotional reaction'' (1980, p.55). In the case of a phobia, a 
response probe would be an exemplar of the fear-provoking stimulus (preferably one that 
is distinct from the stimulus used in the exposure procedure), whereas in PTSD, a 
response probe might be an object related to the trauma. Rachman’s theory was intended 
to account for reductions in a wide range of abnormal emotional responses, and it has 
been invoked to explain symptom improvements in various anxiety disorders, including 
social anxiety disorder (SAD; Huppert & Foa, 2004), panic disorder (Lang, Cuthbert, & 
Bradley, 1998), posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Litz, Orsillo, Kaloupek, & 
Weathers, 2000), and specific phobia (Hecker, 1990; for an extensive review, see Foa & 
Kozak, 1999). 
Foa and Kozak (1986) expanded on Rachman’s concept by integrating it with 
Lang’s (1977; 1979) bioinformational theory of fear, which posited that fear is 
represented in memory as a set of three loosely connected types of propositions 
representing  a)  the  feared  stimulus,  b)  the  fearful  response,  and  c)  interpretive 
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information about the meaning of the stimulus (such as beliefs about the connection 
between the stimulus and response). Foa and Kozak (1986) proposed that emotional 
processing involves the modification of the fear structure such that the connections 
between these three propositions are weakened. 
This modification requires two preconditions. First, the fear structure must be 
sufficiently activated. Activation is best accomplished by introducing stimuli that match 
the fear structure (for example, placing a claustrophobia sufferer into an enclosed space), 
and it may be amplified by inducing physiological symptoms of anxiety characteristic of 
the fear response. When any component of the fear structure is activated, the entire 
structure may be activated via generalization, as a consequence. This explains why 
anxiety can occur in the absence of conscious appraisal of the feared stimulus (Barlow, 
1991). Activation of the structure is graded, such that activation of more of the elements 
leads to more complete activation. 
Second, information incompatible with the fear structure must be provided, so 
that new elements of the network can be formed (Foa & Kozak, 1986). Reduction in 
physiological arousal leads to a dissociation between stimulus and response propositions 
(the stimulus is frightening, but the absence of physiological arousal is incongruent with 
fear), so that the feared stimulus becomes disassociated from fearful responding. The 
structure is further weakened in the presence of incompatible information regarding the 
meaning of the stimulus, such as occurs when threatening predictions regarding the 
stimulus are disconfirmed. 
Some aspects of emotional processing theory have been empirically tested in 
investigations of phobic populations, such as its prediction that distraction will impede 
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emotional processing, and that increased activation of the feared stimulus will enhance 
emotional processing. 
1.3.3.1 Does Distraction Impede Processing? 
 
Emotional processing theory predicts that distraction during exposure will reduce 
fear activation in the short term but will impede emotional processing and thereby hinder 
fear reduction in the long term (Rachman, 1980; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Kamphuis & Telch, 
2000). This should occur in two ways: 1) distraction should hinder the activation of the 
fear structure (thereby blunting the subjective and physiological fear response) and 2) 
distraction should impede the encoding and incorporation of information incompatible 
with fear structure. 
Interest in this question preceded the development of emotional processing 
theories, because therapists had long used distraction during exposure to reduce the 
client’s anxious arousal and improve the procedure’s tolerability (Weir & Marshall, 
1980). The question also has theoretical relevance, however. Indeed, one impetus for 
Rachman’s development of emotional processing theory was his reasoning that, “If fear 
reduction…is indeed facilitated by relaxation, and if relaxation increases the vividness of 
the phobic imagery, perhaps it is the vividness that mediates the therapeutic value of 
desensitization.” (1980, p. 53). In contrast, Bandura’s (1977) self-efficacy model predicts 
the opposite, that successful distraction in the presence of phobic stimuli represents a 
mastery experience, which would increase self-efficacy and reduce fear. 
To date, the experimental findings regarding the effects of distraction have been 
mixed. Several studies have yielded evidence that distraction does impede fear activation 
and reduction.   Craske,  Street, Jayamaran,  and  Barlow (1991) provided snake- and 
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spider-phobics six minutes of exposure, during which they received either cognitive load 
distraction, attentional focus, or natural focus. They found that the attentional focus 
group reported greater subjective fear than the distraction and natural focus groups. 
Moreover, several early studies suggested that distraction impeded fear reduction in the 
treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder (Grayson, Foa, & Steketee, 1982, 1986) and 
animal  phobia  (Sartory,  Rachman,  &  Grey,  1982). And  in  several  studies  of 
claustrophobia  treatment,  our  group  found  that  distraction  from  the  fear-provoking 
stimulus  impeded  fear  reduction  relative  to  an  exposure-only  control  condition 
(Kamphuis & Telch, 2000; Telch, Valentiner, Ilai, Young, Powers, & Smits, 2004), 
whereas increasing focus on the stimulus facilitated fear reduction (Sloan & Telch, 2002). 
Other investigators have found evidence to the contrary. In studying individuals 
with blood-injection-injury (BII) phobia, Penfold and Page (1999) and Oliver and Page 
(2003) found that those assigned to engage in distracting  (stimulus-irrelevant) 
conversation during exposure experienced greater fear reduction than those engaging in 
stimulus-relevant conversation. The authors speculated that this resulted from the 
particular phobic target under study (BII), since distraction may help with the reduction 
of disgust, but not fear. However, Johnstone and Page (2004) replicated these results 
using participants with spider phobia, finding that distraction led to greater fear reduction, 
greater increases in self-efficacy, and greater perceived internal control relative to non- 
distracted participants. 
At least one investigation has suggested an inconsistent relationship between 
distraction and fear reduction. Craske, Street, and Barlow (1989) found that 
agoraphobics  undergoing  exposure  therapy  while  distracted  showed  greater  fear 
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reduction  at  posttreatment  than  those  without  distraction,  but  that  the  effects  were 
reversed at the six-month follow-up. 
Why the discrepant findings? At first blush, there appears to be an allegiance 
effect, since each research group produced consistent findings. But since these 
investigators used  a variety of populations and  experimental  preparations,  this 
explanation begs the question: what is responsible for the discrepancies? 
In a study predating many of these investigations, Rodriguez and Craske (1993) 
reviewed the literature on distraction and exposure. Since there were only four available 
studies, they were unable to draw any strong conclusions. However, they drew a useful 
distinction between cognitive and perceptual distractors. Cognitive distractors are those 
which decrease cognitive resources sufficiently to impede higher level processing. 
Perceptual distractors, in contrast, do not necessarily consume a high degree of 
attentional resources. According to emotional processing theory, a perceptual distractor 
that does not sufficiently absorb cognitive resources should not impede processing. 
As first suggested by Telch et al. (2004), this distinction may explain the 
discrepant findings. The Page group distracted participants by engaging them in 
“stimulus-irrelevant, personally-relevant conversation” (p. 257). Craske et al. (1989) had 
agoraphobic participants distract themselves by focusing on the external environment or 
engaging in distracting thoughts, such as spelling pronouns backward. And in the 1991 
study, Craske and colleagues distracted snake- and spider-phobics by having them listen 
to target words in audiotaped passages while undergoing exposure. None of these 
manipulations seem to be nearly as demanding as those used in the Telch studies, which 
employed highly demanding cognitive-load distractors such as the Seashore Rhythm Test 
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(Telch et al., 2004) and a complicated arithmetic dual processing cognitive load task 
(Kamphuis & Telch, 2000). Indeed, it may even be that a low level of distraction makes 
the exposure procedure more tolerable and serves to prevent the use of safety behaviors, 
paradoxically increasing focus on the phobic target. 
1.3.3.2 Does Fear Activation Enhance Processing? 
 
In Rachman’s (1980) introduction of emotional processing, he observed that 
therapeutic successes were associated with the clients’ experiencing phobic or traumatic 
emotional reactions during the therapy session. Likewise, Foa and Kozak (1986) saw 
activation of the fear structure as a necessary precondition for processing to occur. 
Several investigators have tested this prediction, using different methods of 
inferring activation of the fear structure. In an examination of spider phobics, Zoellner, 
Echiverri, and Craske (2000) inferred activation by measuring participants’ posttreatment 
memory of 1) physical characteristics of the phobic stimulus, and 2) aspects of their own 
anxious responding.   They found that better memory for anxious responding, but not 
memory for the spider, predicted greater reductions in anticipatory and actual anxiety1. 
 
Other authors have suggested that activation of the fear structure can be inferred from 
subjective and physiological fear activation. Early studies found that greater initial fear 
activation led to greater fear reduction (Kozak, Foa, and Steketee,1988; Borkovec & 
Sides, 1979). In contrast, Telch, Valentiner, Ilai, Petruzzi, & Hehmsoth (2000) and 
Kamphuis and Telch (2000) found no relationship between fear activation and treatment 
 
 
 
1 Though they did not find a difference between the distraction and natural conditions, this might have 
resulted from phobic individuals’ tendency to focus away from the phobic stimulus. (Tolin, Lohr, Lee, & 
Sawchuk, 1999). Indeed, this tendency makes the interpretation of “natural focus” conditions difficult to 
interpret, since individuals in these conditions may spontaneously engage in distraction. 
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outcome, and Telch et al (2004) actually found a negative relationship between fear 
activation and treatment outcome. 
1.3.4 Fear Reduction and Emotion Regulation 
 
Though emotional processing theories are invoked to explain the maintenance and 
reduction of a various clinical symptoms aside from anxiety, many experimental tests of 
the theories have used fear reduction paradigms. These studies have largely supported 
the prediction that cognitive-load distraction impedes emotional processing, and they 
have largely failed to support the prediction that initial fear activation is necessary for 
processing to occur. Fear reduction studies have served as a useful tool for testing these 
theories, because exposure represents a powerful, reliable, and ecologically valid emotion 
manipulation, which can be easily introduced and parametrically altered. 
For these same reasons, fear reduction studies provide a fitting context for the 
study of emotion regulation. Recent theories of emotion regulation conceptualize 
emotions as dynamic processes, and the tightly controlled methodologies used in fear 
reduction studies allow detailed micro-analyses of the  emotional  trajectory.  These 
studies are also ecologically valid, in that individuals confronting anxiety-provoking 
situations naturally engage in emotional regulation strategies, which can be 
experimentally manipulated. 
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1.4 Emotion Regulation 
 
1.4.1 Definitional Issues 
 
The question of  how best to manage emotions has long been of interest to 
psychologists (e.g. Freud, 1915/1957; Hochshild, 1983; Wegner & Pennebaker, 1993). In 
the past few decades, emotion regulation has received increasing attention from 
researchers in cognitive, clinical, social, and developmental psychology, who have 
attempted to better define the construct (e.g. Gross & Levenson, 1993; Linehan, 1993). 
Since emotions are usually regulated in some way (Tompkins, 1984), the question of how 
to distinguish emotion regulation from emotion generation and other related processes is 
a delicate one (Gross, 1998b; Mayer & Salovey, 1995; Davidson, 1998). Emotion 
regulation is intertwined with a number of self-regulatory functions (Kring & Werner, 
2004), including attention (Craske, 2005; Vuilleumier & Armony, 2001), higher level 
cognitive processing (Philippot, Baeyens, Douilliez, & Francart, 2004), and emotional 
knowledge (Feldman Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001), and investigations 
of the construct are often couched in terms of one or more of these related functions. For 
example, Craske defines emotion regulation as “the reaction to emotional reactivity, with 
an emphasis on the ability to shift attention (such as from something unpleasant) and to 
focus attention in a sustained way, and the ability to activate or inhibit behavior” (2003, 
p.52). Gross defines the construct more broadly (1998b, p.275), as “the process by which 
individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they 
experience these emotions.” This definition is particularly useful in that it allows for the 
examination of emotion regulation from a number of different perspectives. 
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There are some ambiguities surrounding emotion regulation’s relationship to 
similar constructs such as coping (Folkman, 1997) and affect regulation (Westen, 1994). 
Emotion regulation and coping both fall under the heading of affect regulation (Gross, 
1998b), but emotion regulation differs from coping in that it excludes attempts to achieve 
nonemotional goals. Also, emotion regulation is not limited to the reduction of negative 
emotions, but rather, involves the enhancement and reduction of both positive and 
negative emotions in a situationally appropriate manner. 
Effective emotion regulation plays an important role in healthy psychological 
functioning (Tice & Baumeister, 1993; Seligman, 1991). Effective regulation of positive 
and negative emotions affects the ability of both adults (Shiota, Campos, Keltner, & 
Hertenstein, 2004; Lopes, Salovey, Cote, & Beers, 2005) and children (Eisenberg, Fabes, 
Guthrie & Reiser, 2000) to successfully interact socially, and it is considered an 
important component of emotional intelligence (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 
2001). Several empirical investigations have found that certain emotion regulation styles 
affect psychological health (Martin & Dahlen, 2005; van Middendorp et al., 2005; Gross 
and John, 2002), and that the ability to regulate mood is associated with lowered 
physiological responses to stress (Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, & Epel, 2002). Indeed, 
many types of therapy, such as CBT (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) and Dialectical 
Behavior Therapy (DBT; Heard, & Linehan, 1994), involve teaching the client to manage 
aversive emotions. 
Nevertheless, the idea that the successful regulation of emotions is important to 
health appears to be in tension with the view that tight control over one’s emotions can be 
harmful (Pauls, 2005). Psychodynamic theorists have long advised that the inappropriate 
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use of avoidant defense mechanisms (e.g. repression, denial) to manage emotions may be 
associated with poor psychological health (Freud, 1923/1961), and health psychologists 
have found that expressing emotions can lead to improved health outcomes (e.g. 
Horowitz, 1976; Pennebaker, 1989 and 1990; ) 
In an attempt to reconcile these seeming discrepancies and provide a framework 
for the study of emotion regulation, Gross (1998a) developed a process model of emotion 
regulation. Echoing James’ (1884) and Barlow’s (1988) writings on the nature  of 
emotion and anxiety, Gross described emotions as response tendencies that can be 
modulated. Emotions commence with the evaluation of internal or external cues (Frijda, 
1988; Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1966), followed by “a  coordinated set of  behavioral, 
experiential, and physiological emotional response tendencies that together facilitate 
adaptive responding to perceived challenges and opportunities…these response 
tendencies may be modulated, and it is this modulation that gives final shape to manifest 
emotional responses.” (Gross, 1998; p. 225). According to this model, emotions are 
dynamic processes unfolding over time, and they may be regulated at five points “a) 
selection of the situation, b) modification of the situation, c) deployment of attention, d) 
change of cognitions, and e) modulation of the responses.” (1998b). Modulation is an 
ongoing process that can be automatic or controlled, conscious or unconscious. 
Gross (1998a) proposed that the differing views surrounding the effects of 
emotion regulation could be reconciled by distinguishing between antecedent- and 
response-focused emotion regulation strategies. Antecedent strategies are pre-emptive 
attempts to influence an anticipated event of emotional significance. The employment of 
such  strategies  (e.g.  appraisal  and  situation  selection)  would  effectively  avert  an 
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emotional response before it begins. Response strategies, in contrast, are attempts to 
amplify or downregulate an emotional response that is already underway. Because these 
strategies do not attenuate the initial stress response, and because considerable effort is 
required to control a response once initiated, these strategies should be physiologically 
and cognitively taxing relative to antecedent-focused strategies. 
This distinction has received some empirical support. Gross (1998a) presented 
participants with an emotionally arousing film and instructed them to either reappraise 
the film in such a way that they felt nothing (an antecedent strategy) or to outwardly 
suppress their emotions (a response strategy). Both conditions successfully resulted in 
reduced expressed emotion, but only reappraisal led to a reduction in experienced 
emotion, whereas only suppression led to an increase in physiological responding. 
Richards and Gross (1999)  also found evidence  consistent with the  model’s 
prediction that response strategies are demanding. They showed nonclinical 
undergraduate participants a set of slides of badly wounded men accompanied by detailed 
identifying information, and instructed them to either accept or suppress their emotional 
expression while observing the slides. They found that the suppressors displayed poorer 
memory for the information and judged their own memory for the information to be less 
accurate, while also displaying greater cardiovascular activation than those who accepted 
their emotional responses. And, in an examination of the self-reported use of suppression 
and acceptance strategies, Gross and John (2003) found that those who claimed more 
frequent use of suppression strategies reported lower levels of well-being and 
interpersonal functioning than those who used reappraisal strategies. 
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1.4.2 Emotion Regulation and Psychopathology 
 
If successful emotion regulation is associated with healthy functioning, it bears 
asking whether deficits in emotion regulation are involved in disordered functioning. 
According to Kring and Werner (2004), in order to link emotion regulation processes to 
psychopathology, it is necessary to “a) delineate some of the basic processes comprising 
emotion regulation, and b) demonstrate that the use of (or failure to use) emotion 
regulatory processes is associated with an impairment in functioning.” (p. 368). As 
detailed above, Gross (1998b) and others have worked to demarcate these basic 
processes. And, synonymous with a recent re-emergence in interest in the role of 
emotion in psychopathology (Suveg & Kendall, 2007; Samoilov & Goldfried, 2000; 
Westen, 2000), clinical psychologists have begun to document the ways in which 
emotional regulatory deficits are associated with psychopathology (e.g. Berenbaum, 
Raghavan, Le, Vernon, and Gomez; 2003; Cicchetti, Ackerman, and Izard, 1995). 
Emotion regulation is mentioned in the diagnostic criteria of over half of Axis I disorders 
and in all of the Axis II disorders (Gross, 1998b; Gross & Levenson, 1997; Kring and 
Werner, 2004). Deficits in emotion regulation are clearly linked to the defining features 
of some disorders, such as borderline personality disorder (Linehan, 1993), bipolar 
disorder (Leibenbluft, Charney, & Pine, 2003), and attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder (Barkley, 1997; Hinshaw, Simmer, & Heller, 1995). Moreover, emotion 
regulation deficits are implicated in particular theoretical accounts of disorders such as 
GAD (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2002), eating disorders (Safer, Telch, & 
Agras, 2001; Westen & Harnden-Fisher, 2001), and depression (Ladouceuer, Dahl, 
Williamson, Birmaher, Ryan, & Casey, 2005). 
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Emotion regulation deficits are linked to psychopathology in two ways (Cicchetti 
et al., 1995; Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2005). First, individuals may have 
difficulty modulating emotional expression or experience, as is seen to occur in bipolar 
disorder and borderline personality disorder (Berenbaum et al., 2003). Alternately, 
individuals may attempt to suppress or dampen their emotional reactions to a problematic 
degree. Some authors have suggested that such inflexible and context-insensitive 
attempts to avoid or control the experience of unpleasant emotions may play an important 
role in the maintenance and development of anxiety disorders (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, 
Follette, & Strosahl, 1996; Eifert & Forsyth, 2005). As Craske wrote, “management of 
negative affect may be as important as negative affectivity itself in the manifestation of 
excessive and persistent anxiety, and maladaptive reactions to negative affect may be 
sufficient for the emergence of anxiety disorders.” (2005, p. 51) 
The idea that psychological problems may arise from attempts to manage 
emotions via avoidance and control (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006; 
Blackledge and Hayes, 2001; Lonigan & Phillips, 2001) has contributed to the 
development of newer therapeutic modalities that introduce emotional acceptance as an 
alternative to avoidance or control. In acceptance- mindfulness-based therapies, such as 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999b) and 
Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002), 
clients are encouraged to experience their emotions, thoughts, and bodily sensations fully 
without trying to change, control, or avoid them (for a review of such therapies, see 
Hayes, Follettte, & Linehan, 2004).  In these therapies, the therapist may even warn the 
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client of the potentially harmful nature of avoidance strategies, and they encourage the 
client to abandon them. 
Avoidant emotion regulation strategies may manifest in a number of ways. 
Avoidance may be subtle and internal, such as in GAD, in which engagement in worry 
may represent a  compulsive, avoidant response to unpleasant thoughts and feelings 
(Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Mennin, 2004), or in OCD, in which engaging in 
compulsive behaviors leads to temporary reduction of anxiety. Alternately, avoidance 
may be manifested outwardly, such as in social phobia (Wells, Clark, Salkovskis, 
Ludgate, Hackman, Gelder, 1995), or in excessive drinking or other risky behaviors 
(Marlatt, 1994). Though topographically distinct, these behaviors are functionally 
equivalent in that they are intended to reduce anxiety in the short term, but they maintain 
or amplify anxiety in the long term. 
The view that avoidance and control of emotions can cause or maintain 
psychopathology is consistent with a number of well-supported behavioral models of 
anxiety disorders. According to the two-process theory of anxiety (Mowrer, 1960), 
avoidance of anxiety-provoking stimuli is responsible for the maintenance of anxious 
responding. Others (Salkovskis, 1991; Telch, 1991) have suggested that avoidance and 
other defensive actions contribute to the maintenance of pathological fear by reducing 
opportunities for threat disconfirmation. Consistent with this view, a number of 
investigators have demonstrated that the use of avoidant anxiety-management strategies, 
or safety behaviors, can impede fear reduction (Powers, Smits, & Telch, 2004; Sloan & 
Telch, 2000; Salkovskis, Clark, Hackman, Wells, & Gelder, 1999). In recognition of the 
detrimental effects of anxiety avoidance maneuvers, many CBT packages for anxiety 
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encourage the identification and fading of safety behaviors that maintain the particular 
anxious response. 
Recent experimental challenge studies have shown that individuals who rely on 
emotion-control strategies reported greater emotional distress and negative thoughts in 
response to carbon dioxide inhalation challenge procedures (Spira, Zvolensky, Eifert, & 
Feldner, 2004; Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert, & Spira, 2003; Karekla, Forsyth, & Kelly, 
2004) and emotionally distressing film clips (Sloan, 2004). Converging evidence for the 
ineffectiveness of such strategies also comes from investigations of thought suppression 
(see Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000 for a review), which suggest that attempts to suppress are 
largely ineffective during the suppression attempt and may actually lead to a rebound 
effect, in which the target thought occurs far more frequently following the cessation of 
the suppression attempt (Wegner, Scheider, Carter, & White, 1987; Clark, Ball, & Pape, 
1991; Clark, Winton, & Thynn, 1993). There is also evidence that the use of thought 
suppression strategies is associated with depression (Beevers, Wenzlaff, Hayes, & Scott, 
1999). In an experimental investigation, Marcks and Woods  (2005)  instructed 
participants to suppress, accept, or monitor personal intrusive thoughts.  Those instructed 
to accept experienced a decrease in discomfort level after having used this strategy, 
whereas those instructed to suppress experience a higher level of discomfort (neither 
strategy produced differences in the frequency of the thoughts). 
1.4.2.1 Experimental Investigations 
 
A number of investigators have examined whether instructional manipulations of 
emotional control and acceptance can impact physiological and behavioral responses to 
emotionally evocative challenge procedures.  To date, the physiological data regarding 
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the effects of control attempts seem to be inconsistent across physiological response 
channels. Jackson, Malmstadt, Larson, and Davidson (2000) instructed participants to 
either suppress, enhance, or maintain their emotional responses to emotionally evocative 
pictures. They found that suppression evinced smaller startle eye blinks but led to 
increased corrugator activity. Gross and Levenson (1993) had subjects watch a disgust- 
eliciting film while suppressing their outward emotional responses. Compared to a 
control group who did not suppress emotions, these participants exhibited increases in 
electrodermal responding and some cardiovascular measures, while showing decreases in 
heart rate. Several other studies by Gross’s group have suggested a link between 
suppression and greater cardiovascular activation (Richards & Gross, 1999;  Gross, 
1998a; Gross & Levenson, 1997). 
Other investigators have considered how emotional control affects response to 
painful stimuli. Hayes, Bissett, and colleagues (1999a) had participants complete a cold- 
pressor pain tolerance task after they received one of three rationales: an acceptance 
based rationale, a coping/control rationale, or an attention (placebo) rationale. They found 
that participants receiving the acceptance rationale displayed improved tolerance for pain 
despite reporting no differences in the degree of pain experienced. Similarly, Cioffi and 
Holloway (1993) gave participants a cold-pressor test and randomized them to (a) focus 
on the sensations, (b) distract themselves, or (c) suppress their feelings of pain. 
Individuals in the suppression condition showed increased heart-rate and electrodermal 
responding and slower recovery from pain as compared to the other two groups. 
There have been several investigations into the effects of control and acceptance 
of anxious responding.  Eifert and Heffner (2003) exposed 60 undergraduates to two 10- 
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minute periods of 10% CO2 enriched air, which causes symptoms of anxiety similar to 
those experienced in a panic attack. They trained the participants either to accept the 
sensations, to control them via diaphragmatic breathing, or to use no particular anxiety 
regulation technique. Participants trained to accept the feelings were less avoidant and 
reported less intense fear and fewer catastrophic thoughts than those in the other two 
groups. In a similar design, Feldner, Zvolnesky, Eifert, and Spira (2003) had 48 non- 
clinical participants inhale 20% CO2-enirched air, and instructed them to either inhibit or 
simply observe the emotional state that was induced. Participants high in emotional 
avoidance (as measured by the AAQ; see Measures) responded with greater anxiety when 
inhibiting than when observing their emotional states. Not only does this provide 
converging evidence that acceptance of an aversive anxiogenic stimulus may be more 
beneficial than resistance to it, but it suggests that the effects of emotional control may be 
moderated by an avoidant style of emotion regulation. 
1.4.2.2 Emotional Control and Acceptance and Emotional Processing 
 
Few studies have considered how acceptance affects emotional processing. One 
notable exception is reported in Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, and Hoffman (2006). 
Using a paradigm similar to that of Richards and Gross (1999), they instructed 60 
participants with anxiety and/or mood disorders to watch an emotion-provoking film and 
instructed them to either accept or suppress their emotional response. They then 
measured the participants’ emotional reaction immediately after the film, and again 2 
minutes later. They found that both groups reported similar levels of subjective and 
physiological distress during the film, and that the suppression showed an increase in HR 
while the acceptance group showed a decrease in HR.  However, the acceptance group 
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reported less negative affect in the post-film recovery period than did the suppression 
group. Though the authors did not invoke emotional processing in explaining their 
finding, perhaps the construct could prove useful in explaining these results. It may be 
that emotional suppression prevented the full processing of negative emotions that were 
elicited during the film, thereby prolonging negative affective experience. Indeed, this 
seems to closely fit emotional processing theory’s account of post-traumatic symptoms 
(Foa & Riggs, 1995), according to which the employment of dissociative strategies for 
coping with overwhelming negative emotion prevents complete in situ processing of the 
trauma. Although this speculation requires further empirical testing, it bears examining 
whether emotion regulation could influence emotional processing. 
Aside from this single example of a study in which subjective emotion was 
measured at two time points, the literature has largely concentrated on how emotional and 
cognitive acceptance and suppression strategies might affect the immediate emotional 
response to painful and anxiety-provoking stimuli. Though emotion regulation theories 
stress the dynamic nature of emotion, prior work has largely focused on the way these 
strategies affected emotional responses at one point in time, rather than how emotional 
responding unfolds over time. While some authors have investigated cognitive 
responding immediately following a challenge procedure (the rebound effect in thought 
suppression has been studied extensively; see Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000 for a review), 
little attention has been paid to emotional responding. Thus, it remains an open question 
how emotion regulation strategies would affect emotional processing. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE PRESENT STUDY 
 
 
2.1 Emotion Regulation and Emotional Processing 
 
Exposure therapy is a popular, empirically-validated treatment technique that is 
frequently used to treat anxiety disorders (Barlow, 2002). There is a robust literature 
investigating how manipulating participants’ attentional resources (e.g. Rodriguez & 
Craske, 1993) and attempts to manage anxiety (safety behaviors; Wells, Clark, & 
Salkovskis, 1995; Sloan & Telch, 2002) during exposure can enhance or impede its 
efficacy. Over the past twenty years, this research has been largely guided by emotional 
processing theory (Rachman, 1980; Foa & Kozak, 1986), which attempts to explain how 
exposure works and to identify factors affecting its efficacy. Several well-controlled 
experiments have supported the theory’s prediction that presenting a cognitively 
demanding distractor during exposure will impede symptom reduction (Grayson, Foa, & 
Steketee, 1982, 1986; Kamphuis & Telch, 2000; Telch et al., 2004). 
Working from a separate theoretical context, some researchers have attempted to 
classify various emotion regulation strategies (Gross, 1998b) and to understand how these 
strategies can cause or maintain psychopathology (e.g. Kring & Werner, 2004). Some 
have suggested that the rigid or excessive use of emotion-avoidance or emotion- 
suppression techniques contributes to the development and maintenance of anxiety 
disorders (Blackledge & Hayes, 2001) and that substituting these techniques with 
emotional acceptance techniques can lead to effective symptom reduction (Hayes et al., 
1999b). 
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Support for such an approach to anxiety treatment comes from correlational 
evidence that the habitual use of emotional avoidance (Zvolensky & Forsyth, 2002; 
Brown, Kahler Zvolensky, Lejuez, & Ramsey, 2001), emotion suppression (Gross & 
John, 2003), and thought suppression (Beevers et al., 1999; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2001) 
strategies is associated with poorer psychological health, along with experimental 
evidence suggesting that emotion suppression is cognitively demanding (Richards & 
Gross, 1999) and largely ineffective (for a review, see Barnes-Holmes et al., 2004). 
Conversely, experimental evidence suggests that the acceptance of unpleasant thoughts 
(Marcks & Woods, 2005) and emotions (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006; Eifert & Heffner, 
2003) is associated with less subjective distress in response to distress-inducing challenge 
procedures. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that the habitual use of suppression 
strategies is associated with poorer functioning, and that their immediate use leads to 
increased anxious responding. Suppression strategies, however, may also be involved in 
the long-term maintenance of anxiety. According to emotional processing theory, the use 
of a cognitively demanding emotion regulation strategy (such as emotional suppression) 
should impede symptom reduction during exposure. It may be that the habitual use of 
suppression to cope with anxiety prevents emotional processing from occurring when a 
participant comes into contact with fear-provoking stimuli. Suppression may represent a 
sort of subtle safety behavior, which paradoxically serves to maintain anxiety by 
ultimately blocking or at least attenuating the effective cognitive processing of threat 
disconfirming information. 
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If that is the case, we would expect the experimental induction of emotion 
suppression strategies to retard fear reduction during exposure. Conversely, if acceptance 
of anxiety can be experimentally demonstrated to enhance fear reduction, this would 
argue for the integration of acceptance-based rationales into traditional exposure 
therapies. Thus, the proposed study addresses a theoretical question that also could have 
some direct clinical implications. 
The present study involves a 3-arm randomized clinical trial. Participants 
displaying claustrophobic symptoms were randomly assigned to receive 30 minutes of 
exposure to an enclosed space in one of three treatment conditions: (a) Exposure with 
instructions to accept the emotional response (ACC); (b) Exposure with instructions to 
suppress the emotional response (SUP); or (c) Exposure-only control (EO). Outcome 
measures included peak fear (and a reliable change index derived from peak fear), threat 
expectancies, phobic self-efficacy, and heart rate (HR) reactivity. Assessments were 
conducted prior to treatment, immediately following treatment, and at one-month follow- 
up. Theory-relevant process data (peak fear, threat expectancies, phobic self-efficacy, 
and acceptance of anxiety) were gathered during and immediately following each trial 
within the treatment session. 
2.2 Hypotheses 
 
2.2.1 Outcome Hypotheses 
 
It was expected that participants assigned to the ACC group would display greater 
reductions in claustrophobic fear than those assigned to the EO group, who would in turn 
display greater fear reduction than those assigned to the SUP group.  More specifically, 
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we expected to see this particular pattern of differences in fear reduction (ACC > EO > 
SUP): 
1) From pre-treatment to follow-up, on a composite index of cognitive, behavioral, 
and physiological measures2. We also expected to see a consistent pattern of 
differences on these measures, as considered individually. 
2) From pre-treatment to posttreatment, on a composite index of behavioral, and 
physiological measures3. We also expected to see a consistent pattern of 
differences on these measures, as considered individually. 
3) From pre- to posttreatment, and from pre-treatment to follow-up, in the 
percentage of participants in each group who display a reliable change in 
behavioral fear on each of the two BATs and self-reported claustrophobic fear 
(CLQ). 
2.2.2 Moderator Hypotheses 
 
A moderator is defined as a variable that “affects the direction and/or strength of 
the relation between an independent or predictor variable and a dependent or criterion 
variable.” (Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1174). We aimed to examine the potential 
moderating effects of several theory-relevant and clinically-relevant variables on the 
relationship between emotion regulation strategy and treatment response. More 
specifically, we expected that: 
1. Among participants scoring higher in dispositional measures of thought 
suppression and emotional avoidance, EO participants would more closely 
resemble SUP participants in terms of treatment response (reduction in BAT fear) 
2 This index comprises peak fear for BATs 1 and 2, HR reactivity, and self-reported claustrophobic fear. 
3 This index comprises peak fear for BATs 1 and 2, and HR reactivity 
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than those in the other two groups (ACC > EO = SUP), since these highly 
avoidant EO participants would be more likely to spontaneously engage in 
suppression during the task. 
2. Conversely, among participants scoring lower in these measures, we expected that 
EO participants would more closely resemble ACC participants (ACC = EO > 
SUP). 
3. Higher dispositional measures of suppression (WBSI), emotional avoidance 
(AAQ), and emotional suppression (ERQ-S) would predict reduced treatment 
response across conditions. 
4. Baseline severity (CLQ scores at pre-treatment), community status, and degree of 
impairment (DSM-IV criterion E) would not predict treatment response across 
conditions. 
2.2.3 Process Hypotheses 
 
Previous studies (Sloan & Telch, 2002; Kamphuis and Telch, 2000) have 
demonstrated that manipulating parameters of exposure can lead to differences not only 
in treatment outcome, but also in how fear and threat expectancies change over the course 
of a 30-minute exposure session. A process-level analysis allows us to better explore the 
intricacies of individual change. For each participant, hierarchical linear modeling 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) was used to model changes in fear and other process- 
relevant cognitive variables for individuals undergoing the exposure procedure. These 
models allowed us test the following hypotheses: 
Process Hypothesis 1: A significant effect of exposure condition will be observed for 
initial fear activation and fear decline during treatment. 
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Hypothesis 1a: The ACC group will display greater fear activation and between- 
trial fear reduction relative to the other two treatment groups (EO or SUP). 
Hypothesis 1b: Participants assigned to the SUP group will display significantly 
lower fear activation and between-trial fear reduction relative to the other two treatment 
groups (EO or ACC). 
Process Hypothesis 2: A significant effect of exposure condition will be observed for the 
putative mediators of fear reduction (self-efficacy, acceptance of anxiety, and 
suffocation/entrapment concerns) during treatment. 
Hypothesis 2a: The ACC group will display significantly greater between-trial 
improvements in self-efficacy, acceptance of anxiety, and suffocation/entrapment 
concerns relative to the two other treatment groups (EO or SUP). 
Hypothesis 2b: Participants assigned to the SUP group will display significantly 
lower between-trial improvements in self-efficacy, acceptance of anxiety, and 
suffocation/entrapment concerns relative to the other two treatment groups (EO or ACC). 
Process Hypothesis 3: Process-related variables mediate the relationship between 
exposure and fear. 
Hypothesis 3a: When considered separately, changes in threat expectancies, 
coping self-efficacy, and acceptance of anxiety will each mediate the association between 
exposure and fear reduction. 
Hypothesis 3b: When combined into a single model, acceptance of anxiety will 
account for the greatest proportion of the mediated pathway between exposure and fear 
reduction. 
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Process  hypothesis  4:  Mediational  pathways  will  vary  as  a  function  of  treatment 
condition. 
Hypothesis 4a: Among ACC participants, the relationship between exposure and 
fear will be mediated most strongly by acceptance of anxiety. 
Hypothesis 4b: Among SUP participants, the relationship between exposure and 
fear will be mediated most strongly by self-efficacy. 
Hypothesis 4c: Among EO participants, the relationship between exposure and 
fear will be mediated most strongly by threat expectancies. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
 
 
3.1 Participants 
 
Study participants (N = 59) were recruited from the general Austin community (n 
 
= 6), and from the University of Texas Department of Psychology undergraduate research 
pool (n = 53). In return for their participation, community participants received $30, and 
university students received introductory psychology credit. Participants were assigned 
such that the proportion of community participants was roughly equal across conditions . 
To qualify for the study, all participants were required to demonstrate marked 
claustrophobic fear, as indicated by their inability to remain in one of our claustrophobia 
test chambers with a fear level less than 40 on a 100 point scale (averaged across two 
consecutive one-minute trials) . Exclusion criteria included 1) presence of a medical 
condition (i.e., pregnancy, respiratory disorder, cardiovascular disease) that would 
contraindicate participation in one or more treatment or assessment activities; or 2) 
current DSM-IV diagnosis of bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, paranoid or other psychotic 
disorder, or organic mental disorder. 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 65 years of age and comprised 78.00% 
women and 41.70% minorities. 
3.2 Experimental Design 
Participants were  randomly assigned to one of  three conditions, which were 
matched on duration of exposure (30 minutes): (a) Exposure with instructions to accept 
the emotional response (ACC); (b) Exposure with instructions to suppress the emotional 
response (SUP); or (c) Exposure with no emotion-regulation instructions (EO). Theory- 
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relevant process data (peak fear, threat expectancies, phobic self-efficacy, and acceptance 
of anxiety) were gathered between trials during the treatment session. Primary outcome 
measures (fear ratings) were gathered during behavioral approach tests (BATs) at 3 
timepoints: prior to treatment, immediately following treatment, and at a one-month 
follow-up. Secondary outcome measures included self-reported claustrophobia symptoms 
(assessed at pre-treatment and follow-up) and HR reactivity. 
3.3 Assessment 
 
3.3.1 Diagnostic Assessment 
 
Clinical status was assessed using the specific phobia module of the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV diagnoses (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 
1994). 
3.3.2 Outcome Measures 
 
3.3.2.1 Primary Outcome Measure: Fear During BATs 
 
In order to measure participants’ fear response when entering an enclosed space, 
four Behavioral Assessment Tests (two trials each of BAT-1 and BAT-2) were performed 
at each of the three assessment points. The BATs were procedurally identical but used 
different claustrophobia chambers, both of which were located in a darkened room in our 
laboratory. In order to minimize extraneous participant exposure to these chambers, the 
participant was only allowed in the room during the BAT and treatment procedures. 
3.3.2.1.1 BAT Stimuli 
 
In order to accurately assess the generalizability of treatment gains, the two 
stimuli were intended to differ from one another significantly, ideally on each sensory 
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modality.  Both of the BATs were small wooden boxes of the following dimensions: 41 
cm × 76 cm × 180 cm. They differed from each other in the following ways. 
1. The BAT-1 chamber was placed upright, so that the participant would enter and 
remain standing in the chamber. The BAT-2 was placed flat on the ground, like a coffin, 
so that the participant would lie prone. 
2 The interior walls of the BAT-2 chamber were lined with sandpaper, whereas 
the interior walls of the BAT-1 chamber were lined with soft Styrofoam, and the 
participant’s head would rest on a pillow. 
3. The BAT-1 chamber was internally lit by a string of Christmas lights; the BAT- 
2 chamber was dark. 
4. The BAT-1 chamber was lined with car air fresheners that emitted a fake pine 
scent; the BAT-2 chamber was lined with small pieces of bar soap. Both the soap and the 
air fresheners were changed periodically to maintain these scents. 
5. An electric fan was placed on top of the BAT-1 chamber, whose vibrations 
resonated through the chamber loudly. The BAT-2 chamber was completely silent. 
3.3.2.1.2 BAT Procedure 
 
The experimenter began each BAT trial by introducing the participant to the 
chamber and providing the following instructions: “Now, we are going to enter the room, 
and I will ask you to enter the chamber. When you enter the chamber, I will lock the 
door. However, it is important that you understand that you can leave the chamber at 
any time if you get too uncomfortable. If you knock on the inside of the chamber, I will 
immediately undo the lock and open the door. Otherwise, I will signal to you that the 
trial is over by opening the door.” 
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During the trial, heart rate and length of time spent in the chamber were 
monitored. After 60 seconds, the chamber door was opened and the participant was 
instructed to exit, unless the participant chose to exit early4. After exiting the chamber, 
the participant provided ratings of beginning, ending, and peak fear on a Likert scale 
ranging from 0 (no fear) to 100 (extreme panic). 
Peak fear rating. The primary outcome measure was a composite measure of the 
participant’s peak fear on BATs 1 and 2, averaged across both 1-minute trials at each 
assessment point (see rationale below). 
Reliable change. In order to verify that observed change in peak fear ratings over 
time was not simply due to measurement error, we calculated a reliable change index 
(RCI; Jacobson & Truax, 1991) for each participant, using the formula, 
RCI= X2-X1 / Sdiff 
 
where  
 
Sdiff = √(2(SE)2) 
 
and 
 
SE = S1√(1-rxx). 
 
In calculating RCI, we assumed rxx, the reliability of the fear measure, to be .8, 
and we calculated S1, the SD of the fear measure, from observed data. We then 
determined reliable change between any two observations by comparing the obtained 
RCI with a cutoff value of 1.96. If │RCI│> 1.96, the observed change was deemed 
reliable. 
 
 
 
 
4 Of 59 participants, 3 asked to exit prior to 60 seconds on BAT-1, and 6 asked to exit early on BAT-2. 
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3.3.2.2 Secondary Outcome Measures 
 
Claustrophobia Questionnaire (CLQ; Radomsky, Rachman, Thordarson, 
McIsaac, & Teachman, 2001). The CLQ is a 26-item measure assessing two factors: 
suffocation and restriction concerns. The authors report that the scale has good internal 
consistency, test-retest reliability, and predictive validity. The CLQ includes two 
subscales: Suffocation Scale (SS) & Restriction Scale (RS). The SS is a 14-item self- 
report scale assessing fear of suffocation. Items (e.g. “Working under a car for 15 
minutes.”) are rated on a 0 (not at all anxious) to 4 (extremely anxious) Likert scale. The 
SS is a 12-item self-report scale assessing fear of entrapment. Items (e.g., “Standing for 
15 minutes in a straight jacket”) are rated on a 0 (not at all anxious) to 4 (extremely 
anxious) Likert scale. Both subscales have shown good psychometric properties 
(Rachman & Taylor, 1993). 
Heart-rate (HR) reactivity during BATs was measured using an ambulatory heart- 
rate monitor (Polar model RS800; Polar Electro, Inc.; 1111 Marcus Avenue, Suite M15, 
Lake Success, NY), which registered both peak and average HR for each exposure trial. 
HR reactivity was defined as the difference between the average HR recorded during the 
trial and the participant’s recovery HR (average HR recorded over a 3-minute period at 
the conclusion of the study session)5. 
 
3.3.3 Process Measures 
 
In order to examine the mechanisms of fear change during treatment, the 
following measures were collected during each of the six 5-min. treatment trials (see 
3.4.2.2): 
5 HR difference scores for pre-treatment and posttreament BATs were calculated using session 1 recovery 
HR, whereas HR difference scores for FU BATs were calculated using session 2 recovery HR. 
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Subjective fear indices. Immediately after each trial, participants rated beginning, 
ending, and peak levels of fear they had experienced while in the chamber on a Likert 
scale ranging from 0 = no fear to 100 = extreme fear. 
Threat expectancies. Immediately before each trial, participants completed a 
modified version of the Claustrophobia Concerns Questionnaire (CCQ; Valentiner et al., 
1996). The original CCQ is an empirically derived 8-item scale intended to measure 
threat expectancies in claustrophobia by asking participants to rate their concern about 
suffocation and entrapment on a Likert scale ranging from 0 (no concern) to 100 (extreme 
concern). This scale has displayed high internal consistency and test-retest reliability 
(Valentiner et al., 1996). To reduce the number of ratings taken at each treatment trial, 
we used only two of the original four suffocation items, and two of the four entrapment 
items. In the current sample, the measure displayed good reliability (α = .84)6. 
 
Coping self-efficacy. Prior to each treatment trial, participants completed a 
modified version of the claustrophobia-specific Coping Self-Efficacy Questionnaire 
(CSEQ; Valentiner et al., 1996). The original CSEQ is an empirically-derived 4-item 
measure intended to measure an individual’s confidence in their ability to manage anxiety 
symptoms while in an enclosed space. Items such as “Estimate your confidence in being 
able to reduce your fear to a manageable level…” are measured on a Likert scale ranging 
from 0 (no confidence) to 100 (extreme confidence). The scale has displayed high 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability (Valentiner et al., 1996). The modified 
version used in the present study used only two of the original four items, and displayed 
good reliability (α = .85). 
6 Reliability statistics for all process measures were calculated on measures collected prior to the first 
treatment trial. 
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Acceptance of anxiety. Prior to each treatment trial, participants completed a 2- 
item author-developed measure of acceptance of anxiety. Participants responded on a 5- 
point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” to the following 
items: “My anxiety does not bother me” and “It is bad to feel anxious” (reverse scored). 
Reliability analyses yielded α = .33. Therefore, these items were analyzed separately. 
Heart-rate reactivity (HR) scores were obtained and calculated according to the 
same procedure as outcome HR reactivity scores (see 3.3.2.2). 
3.3.4 Putative Moderators 
 
In order to identify moderators of the relationship between emotion regulation 
strategy and treatment efficacy (change in primary outcome measures), the following 
measurements were taken prior to treatment. 
Experiential avoidance was measured using the 16-item Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes et al., 2004; Bond & Bunce, 2003). The AAQ is a 16-item 
self-report questionnaire that measures two factors: acceptance/avoidance of unpleasant 
internal experiences, and willingness to pursue goals in the presence of those experiences. 
Items such as “I’m not afraid of my feelings” and “Worries can get in the way of 
 
my success” are presented on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from “never true” to “always 
true.” Eight of the items are reverse scored, and a higher total score indicates greater 
psychological acceptance. The scale has good concurrent validity with regard to measures 
of emotional disturbance (Hayes et al., 1996). 
Tendency to suppress unwanted thoughts was measured using the White Bear 
Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). The WBSI is a 15-item self- 
report questionnaire measuring the frequency with which the respondent experiences and 
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tries to prevent the experiences of unwanted thoughts. Items such as “I have thoughts I 
cannot stop” and “There are things I prefer not to think about” are presented on a five- 
point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The measure 
correlates with obsessive thinking and depressive and anxious affect, and has been found 
to display good internal consistency and test-retest stability (Muris, Merckelbach, & 
Horselenberg, 1995). 
Tendency to suppress emotional expressivity was measured using the Suppression 
subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross and John, 2003). This 
self-report questionnaire is comprised of 10 items measuring tendencies to engage in two 
emotion regulation strategies: cognitive reappraisal (e.g., “When I want to feel less 
negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation.”) and expressive 
suppression (e.g., “I keep my emotions to myself.”). The authors reported high internal 
consistency for both the reappraisal (α = .79) and suppression (α = .73) subscales. 
Baseline severity was measured using the CLQ collected at the initial assessment 
session. 
Community status. Participants were classified according to whether they were 
undergraduates recruited through the research subject pool or were other community 
participants. 
Degree of impairment. Participants were classified according to whether they 
endorsed significant phobia-related impairment (DSM-IV criterion E) during the CIDI 
interview. 
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3.3.5 Manipulation Checks 
 
Treatment credibility and expectancy were assessed using a modified version of 
the Credibility/Expectancy Questionnaire (CEQ), which is a widely used measure of 
treatment credibility and expectancy. According to the authors, this 6-item scale assesses 
two factors, credibility and expectancy, and has demonstrated high internal consistency 
within each factor (Cronbach’s α values ranging from .81 to .86 for credibility and from 
.79 to .90 for expectancy) and test-retest reliability (Devilly & Borkovec, 2000). 
Comprehension of instructions was assessed using a 2-item author-constructed 
scale. Responses were provided on a 5-level Likert scale ranging from “Strongly 
Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” to the following two items: (1) “During the procedure, I 
should try to control my emotions as much as possible”; and (2) “The procedure will 
work better if I allow myself to feel whatever feelings I have”. We derived a single, 
unipolar total score by calculating the mean of the first item and the reverse-scored 
second item. This score falls on a 1-5 scale, in which a lower score indicates that the 
participant views emotion-acceptance strategies as more effective at facilitating treatment 
efficacy (as per the ACC instructional set), whereas a higher score indicates that an 
emotion-suppression strategy is seen as more effective7. Among the current sample, this 
measure demonstrated good reliability (α .= 84). 
 
Emotion-regulation strategies were assessed repeatedly through the  session. 
After each treatment trial, participants responded to the following item, “While I was in 
the chamber, I made a CONSCIOUS EFFORT to…” on a 10-level Likert scale ranging 
 
 
7 Participants in the EO condition were provided with no instructions regarding emotion regulation 
strategies. Therefore, among these participants, we interpret this score to reflect prior beliefs regarding the 
utility of these two emotion regulation strategies. 
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from 0 (“Allow my emotions to run their course”) to 100 (“Stay in control of my 
emotions”). The midpoint was labeled “Neither”. 
Immediately after completing the entire exposure procedure, emotion regulation 
strategies were retrospectively assessed using the following 2 items: (a) “While in the 
chamber, how much of a conscious effort did you make to CONTROL your fear and 
anxiety?” and (b) “While in the chamber, how much of a conscious effort did you make 
to ACCEPT your fear and anxiety?” Participants responded on a Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (“No effort”) to 9 (“Strong effort”). 
Unlike the measure of emotion regulation strategies that was employed after each 
trial (which used a single item treating control and acceptance as opposite poles of a 
single construct), this post-treatment measure treated these strategies as independent 
constructs. 
Attentional strategies were measured immediately following the exposure 
procedure, using the following 2 items: (a) “While in the chamber, how much of a 
conscious effort did you make to DISTRACT yourself from what was going on?” and (b) 
“While in the chamber, how much of a conscious effort did you make to PAY 
ATTENTION to what was going on?” Participants responded on a Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (“No effort”) to 9 (“Strong effort”). Because the experimental scripts did not 
differ on their instructions regarding attention regulation (both recommended that the 
participant pay close attention during the procedure), the inclusion of these items served 
an exploratory purpose. Although we were curious about potential interactions between 
attention- and emotion-regulation strategies, no a priori hypotheses were advanced 
regarding these items. 
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3.4 Procedure 
 
3.4.1 Screening 
 
Participants were gathered from two sources: the UT Introductory Psychology 
undergraduate pool, and the local Austin community. 
Undergraduate participants (n = 3200) responded to a 2-item online 
questionnaire that asked them to rate their subjective fear associated with 1) entering an 
enclosed space and 2) being locked in an enclosed space, on a 4-point Likert scale (0 = no 
fear to 3 = extreme fear). Those who reported an average score of 2 (moderate fear) or 
higher on the questionnaire (n = 469) were emailed an invitation to attend the 
experimental session for further screening and possible participation. Those who 
responded expressing interest (n = 123) were then contacted over the phone by a lab staff 
member, who assessed eligibility and self-reported claustrophobia and then invited 
qualifying participants (n = 63) to attend the first session. 
Community participants (n = 30) made initial contact with us via phone or email 
after learning of the study via word-of-mouth, or via referrals from community therapists 
and physicians. These participants were then contacted over the phone by a lab staff 
member and screened in the same manner as the undergraduate participants. Those who 
appeared to qualify (n = 7) were invited to attend the first session. 
3.4.2 Experimental Session 1 
 
Upon arriving at the laboratory, the participant provided informed consent, filled 
out questionnaire packets, and underwent the SCID claustrophobia diagnostic interview. 
The participant then completed the pre-treatment BAT procedure (see section 3.3.2.1), to 
assess initial levels of claustrophobic fear.   Following the BAT, the participant was 
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randomly assigned to listen to one of three audiotaped instructional sets, and then to 
undergo 30 minutes of exposure therapy. Finally, the participant completed a post- 
treatment BAT procedure, which was procedurally identical to the first. 
3.4.2.1 Condition-Specific Instructions (see Appendix D) 
 
Instructional sets for all participants began with a brief (2 paragraph) overview of 
the exposure procedure, including a rationale for its efficacy. EO participants received 
no further instructions before beginning treatment, or in between treatment trials. In 
contrast, ACC and SUP participants then listened to additional, condition-specific 
instructional sets that were equal in duration and parallel in rhetorical structure. These 
instructional sets were based closely on those used in the Campbell-Sills et al. (2006) 
study, which were obtained from the authors. 
In order to improve compliance with the instructions, prior to each treatment trial 
the experimenter provided a brief (< 30 sec.) restatement of the main idea of the 
conditionally appropriate instructional set to those in the ACC and SUP conditions. 
Suppression condition. Participants in this condition were instructed to “try not to 
show what you are feeling, and attempt to minimize the amount of anxiety and other 
emotions you feel in response to the situation”. They were told that attempts to control 
emotion are often appropriate and effective, and they were provided with examples of 
situations in which emotional control is possible. Prior to each treatment trial, they were 
reminded that ‘the exercise will be far more effective if you make a conscious effort to 
control your feelings of fear, and to prevent yourself from experiencing heightened 
anxiety.” 
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Acceptance condition. Participants in this condition were instructed to “try to give 
up the struggle to suppress or control” emotions. They were told that attempts to control 
emotions are often counterproductive and ineffective, and they were provided with 
examples of situations in which emotional control is impossible. Prior to each treatment 
trial they were reminded that “the exercise will be far more effective if you make a 
conscious effort NOT to control your feelings of fear, and to allow yourself to experience 
heightened anxiety.” 
Prior to beginning the treatment, participants completed pre-treatment measures 
of treatment credibility and comprehension of instructions (see section3.3.5). 
3.4.2.2 Exposure Procedure 
 
All participants underwent a total of 30 minutes of in vivo exposure  to the 
claustrophobia chamber used in BAT-2. For the majority of participants (n=57), the 
exposure session comprised a total of six 5-minute trials. However, for participants who 
were unable to remain in the chamber for five minutes at a time (n=2), up to nine trials 
were needed. 
3.4.3 Experimental Session 2: Follow-Up Assessment 
 
All participants were asked to return to the laboratory 30 days later for a follow- 
up assessment. At this session, participants first completed a questionnaire battery that 
included the CLQ, AAQ, and WBSI. They then completed a BAT assessment that was 
procedurally identical to the pre-and post-treatment BATs. Finally, participants were 
provided with a written debriefing statement that indicated the nature and purpose of the 
experiment and described the three treatment conditions. They were also provided with 
referrals to community and/or university mental health resources. 
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3.4.4 Steps for Enhancing Treatment Integrity 
 
In order to assure the greatest possible treatment integrity, assessments and 
treatments were manualized and administered by trained experimenters. 
Manualized protocol. The protocol (see Appendix A) was divided into separate 
sections for each of the two sessions. Scripts were provided throughout the manual to be 
read aloud verbatim by experimenters. 
Experimenter training. The training of experimenters involved a) didactic 
orientation to the project provided by the PI; b) role-plays of procedures with trained 
experimenters; and c) PI observation of assessment and treatment procedures. 
Experimenters were observed, monitored and provided with feedback regarding 
adherence to the experiment protocol. Experimenters were not allowed to administer 
assessments or treatments until they had demonstrated a high degree of proficiency with 
the protocol.  Experimenters also underwent periodic observation by the PI with respect 
to adherence to the treatment protocol. 
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Gender 
% Male) 
 
Comm. Status 
% Psych. Student) 
20.00 31.60 15.00 
 
90.00 
 
89.50 
 
90.00 
Race/Ethnicity 
African-American  1 
American Indian 1  2 
Asian American 1 1 3 
Caucasian 12 12 11 
Latino 5 
 
Putative Moderator Variables 
6 4 
 
% SCID Diagnosis 
or Claustrophobia 85.00 72.20 75.00 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: STATISTICAL ANALYSES 
 
 
4.1 Group Characteristics 
 
To confirm that the randomization procedure produced similar groups, we 
examined differences in continuous measures using analyses-of-variance (ANOVA) and 
differences in categorical measures using Chi-square analyses. Table 1 presents means 
and standard deviations of the demographic and putative moderator measures across the 
three treatment conditions. 
Table 1. Experimental group characteristics at baseline 
Acceptance 
(n=20) 
Suppression 
(n=19) 
Exposure Only 
(n=20) 
 
 
Demographic Variables 
M M M 
(SD) (SD) (SD) 
 
Age 21.90 22.05 19.90 
(10.19) (11.42) (5.34) 
( 
( 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
AAQ-16 68.20 67.47 65.85 
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(7.60) (11.06) (8.74) 
25.52 24.68 24.65 
(4.14) (6.46) (4.93) 
42.95 42.79 41.20 
(4.73) (6.38) (4.93) 
54.65 50.52 49.45 
(7.88) (12.62) (9.12) 
28.75 26.79 25.85 
(4.14) (6.67) (5.06) 
 
15.60 
 
15.05 
 
14.10 
(2.41) (3.27) (3.13) 
10.30 8.68 9.50 
(2.99) (3.84) (3.05) 
44.85 42.26 41.6 
(11.51) (7.66) (6.65) 
29.55 29.79 29.65 
(6.89) (5.06) (5.91) 
15.30 12.47 11.95 
(5.90) (4.96) (4.59) 
 
 
 
 
AAQ-16— 
Willingness 
 
 
AAQ-16—Action 
 
 
WBSI 
 
 
WBSI—Thought 
Suppression 
 
 
 
 
WBSI—Intrusive 
Thoughts 
 
 
WBSI—Self- 
distraction 
 
 
ERQ 
 
 
ERQ—Reappraisal 
 
 
ERQ—Suppression 
 
Note.  AAQ = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire; WBSI = White Bear Suppression Inventory; ERQ = 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation 
 
 
 
No significant differences were found among the demographic variables. There 
was a difference in pre-treatment emotional suppression (ERQ-Suppression) that 
approached significance, F (2, 56) = 2.40, p < .10. Post hoc comparisons revealed that 
ACC participants produced significantly higher scores on this index than EO participants, 
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p < .05, and higher scores than SUP participants, p < .10.  We therefore included this 
measure a covariate in our outcome analyses. 
4.2 Manipulation Check Data 
 
Group means for all measures are displayed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Manipulation check data 
Acceptance 
(n=20) 
 
 
Suppression 
(n=19) 
 
 
Exposure Only 
(n=20) 
M M M 
(SD) (SD) (SD) 
 
CEQ-Credibility 74.44a 85.38b 72.51a 
(18.42) (9.76) (17.08) 
 
CEQ-Expectancy 63.69 a 63.63 a 59.98 a 
(18.89) (12.94) (19.20) 
 
Comprehension of 
Instructions 
(1= acceptance; 
5=suppression) 
 
2.05 a 
(1.21) 
 
4.63 b 
(0.40) 
 
3.13 c 
(1.19) 
 
Emotion Regulation Strategies 
Conscious effort to 
suppress emotions 
(Averaged across 6 
trials) 
33.08 a 
(4.56) 
87.78 b 
(4.81) 
53.83 c 
(4.56) 
 
Accept emotions 7.40 a 5.84 b 5.30 b 
(1.96) (2.90) (1.66) 
 
Control emotions 4.60 a 8.26 b 6.40 c 
(2.89) (1.63) (2.06) 
 
Attentional Strategies 
Distract myself 5.30a 7.53b 4.70a 
(3.08) (1.90) (2.32) 
 
Pay attention 5.95a 4.53 b 3.95 c 
(2..50) (2.32) (1.82) 
Note. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05 in post hoc pairwise 
comparisons. 
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Treatment credibility and expectancy. To confirm that our treatment groups did 
not differ significantly on credibility or expectancy, we examined group differences on 
the subscales of the CEQ using one-way ANOVAs. We found no significant differences 
on the Expectancy subscale, though we did find significant differences Credibility, F (2, 
55) = 3.770, p < .03. Post hoc comparisons revealed that SUP participants found the 
treatment to be significantly more credible than did participants in the ACC group, p 
<.04, and EO group, p <.02 . 
 
Comprehension of instructions. To confirm that the instructional sets were 
sufficiently divergent, we examined the 2- item instruction comprehension scale using 
one-way ANOVAs and found significant differences between treatment groups, F (2, 56) 
= 31.67, p < .01. Post hoc comparisons revealed that SUP participants viewed emotion 
suppression as a more useful strategy for use during the exposure procedure than did EO 
participants (p < .01), who, in turn, viewed emotion suppression as more useful than did 
ACC participants (p < .01). 
Emotion regulation strategies. To confirm that participants in the ACC and SUP 
groups were employing the emotion regulation strategies in a manner consistent with 
instructions, we examined group differences on the 1-item measure of self-reported 
emotion regulation strategies over the course of six treatment trials using a repeated 
measures ANOVA. As expected, treatment groups differed, F (2) = 34.24, p < .01, such 
that SUP participants made a significantly greater effort to control their emotions than did 
EO participants, p < .01, who in turn made a significantly greater effort to control their 
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emotions than did ACC participants,  p < .01.  This suggested that the manipulation was 
successful in producing differential usage of strategies (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Emotion regulation strategies over the course of six treatment trials. 
 
 
Unexpectedly, we also found a main effect for time, F (5) = 9.25, p < .01, 
indicating that participants were more likely to engage in emotion-acceptance strategies 
in later treatment trials, and a time × group interaction, F (10) = 3.04, p < .01, indicating 
that the treatment groups differed in the degree to which their strategies changed over the 
course of treatment. ACC participants displayed a greater increase in the use of emotion- 
acceptance strategies over the course of treatment than did EPX participants, p < .01, who 
in turn displayed a greater  increase  than did SUP participants,  p < .01. Post hoc 
comparisons indicated, however, that all three groups differed significantly from one 
another at each of the 6 time points (p <. 05). 
We also examined group differences in emotion regulation strategies by 
examining the 2-item emotion regulation measure taken immediately following the 
exposure  procedure.     Consistent  with  prediction,  a  one-way  ANOVA  revealed  a 
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significant difference in self-reported emotional acceptance strategies, F (2) = 4.82, p < 
 
.02, such that ACC participants were more likely to report having used these strategies 
than SUP (p < .01) and EO participants (p < .04). Also, we found a significant difference 
in self-reported emotional suppression strategies, F (2) = 12.743, p < .01, such that SUP 
participants were more likely  to report having used these strategies than were EO 
participants (p < .02), who were in turn more likely to report having used these strategies 
than were ACC participants (p < .02). Taken together, these findings provide further 
evidence that experimental assignment produced differential usage of emotion regulation 
strategies. See Figure 2. 
Unlike the measures of self-reported emotional strategies that were taken after 
each treatment trial, which presented a forced choice between strategies, this measure 
allowed participants to retrospectively report the usage of both strategies. In order to 
determine the degree to which these strategies were exclusive of one another, we 
computed correlation coefficients between these two measures. Unexpectedly, we found 
that the measures of usage of these two strategies were not significantly correlated, ρ = - 
.07. That is to say, the use of emotional suppression strategies did not exclude the use of 
emotional acceptance strategies. 
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Figure 2. Emotion regulation strategies used during treatment session. 
 
Attention regulation strategies. A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant 
difference in self-reported attempts to engage in self-distraction, F(2) = 6.92, p < .01, 
such that SUP participants were more likely to report having used these strategies than 
ACC (p < .01) and EO participants (p < .01). Also, we found a significant difference in 
self-reported attempts to “pay attention to what was going on,” F(2) = 4.25, p < .02, such 
that ACC participants were more likely to report having paid attention than were SUP 
participants (p < .05) and EO participants (p < .01). Taken together, these findings 
provide evidence that experimental assignment produced differential usage of attentional 
strategies. See Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Attentional strategies used during treatment. 
 
4.3 Outcome Analyses 
 
4.3.1 Composite Outcome Measures 
 
To identify potential covariates, we regressed our primary outcome measures 
(BAT peak fear scores) at FU on selected dispositional and demographic measures, 
controlling for baseline fear. We found that BAT-2 fear was significantly correlated with 
pre-treatment emotional suppression (ERQ-S), β = 0.33, p < .02.  Therefore, we included 
pre-treatment ERQ-S scores as a covariate, along with treatment credibility (CEQ-C), in 
all outcome analyses. Means and SD’s of all outcome measures are displayed in Table 3. 
To  examine  differences  from  pre-treatment  to  follow-up,  we  conducted  a 
multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) on a composite index of peak fear 
(BATs 1 and 2), HR reactivity (averaged across BATs), and self-reported claustrophobic 
fear (CLQ).  Across all treatment groups, participants displayed a significant decrease in 
the composite fear index, F(4, 34) = 2.87, p < .04.  No interactions were found for time × 
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61.00 14.25 18.00 56.58 8.42 13.75 54.25 11.50 13.33 
(16.11) (16.41) (17.30) (19.37) (12.37) (17.56) (16.80) (17.02) (17.32) 
70.50 11.00 25.00 70.00 7.89 17.81 61.25 7.50 16.39 
(16.13) (15.94) (29.09) (13.94) (9.90) (19.14) (14.95) (13.81) (17.32) 
22.89 
 
12.71 20.00 
 
12.74 20.65 
 
11.32 
(9.42)  (6.94) (10.25)  (9.13) (10.78)  (8.56) 
28.58 
 
17.84 26.74 
 
14.84 28.55 
 
15.37 
(9.90)  (9.95) (9.43)  (10.13) (9.34)  (9.58) 
8.25 1.72 2.90 12.69 4.92 -0.94 10.00 1.43 1.15 
(8.87) (5.72) (8.98) (12..79) (6.93) (7.93) (5.16) (5.42) (5.20) 
 
group,  time  ×  ERQ-S,  or  time  ×  CEQ-C,  suggesting  that  neither  treatment  group 
assignment nor the covariates predicted fear change over time. 
Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations for Posttreatment and Follow-Up Fear Indices 
Acceptance   Suppression   Exposure Only  
Pre Post FU Pre  Post FU Pre  Post FU 
n=20 n=20 n=15 n=19  n=19 n=16 n=20 n=20 n=18 
BAT 1 
peak fear (0-
100) 
 
BAT 2 
peak fear (0-
100) 
 
CLQ: 
Suffocation 
 
 
CLQ: 
Restriction 
 
 
HR 
Reactivity 
 
 
 
Note. Pre = Pretreatment; Post = Posttreatment; FU = Follow Up; BAT = Behavioral Approach Test; 
CLQ = Claustrophobia Questionnaire; HR = Heart rate. HR Reactivity data are averaged across both 
BATs. 
 
 
 
Similarly,   all   participants   displayed   a   significant   decline   on   all   of   the 
disaggregated measures: BAT-1 fear, F(1) = 7.54, p < .01, BAT-2 fear, F(1) = 7.09, p < 
.02, heart rate reactivity, F(1) = 4.01, p < .05, and CLQ, F (1) = 4.06, p <.05. No 
interactions were found for time × group, time × ERQ-S, or time × CEQ-C. 
To examine differences in outcome measures from pre- to post-treatment, we 
conducted a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) on a composite index of 
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peak fear (BATs 1 and 2) and HR reactivity (averaged across BATs)8. Across all 
treatment groups, participants displayed a significant decrease in the composite measure 
of fear, F(3, 45) = 3.96, p < .02. No interactions were found for time × group, time × 
ERQ-S, or time × CEQ-C, suggesting that neither treatment group assignment nor the 
covariates predicted fear change over time. 
Similarly, all participants displayed a significant decline on the following 
disaggregated measures: BAT-1 fear, F(1) = 5.57, p < .03 and BAT-2 fear, F(1) = 11.16, 
p < .01. They also displayed a decline in heart rate reactivity that approached 
significance, F(1) = 2.90, p < .10. No interactions were found for time × group, time × 
ERQ-S, or time × CEQ-C. 
4.3.2 Reliable Change Indices 
 
To determine whether the treatment conditions differed in their ability to produce 
reliable change (RC), we conducted Chi-square analyses on the percentage of participants 
achieving RC on peak fear (BATs 1 and 2) and CLQ. On peak fear for BAT-2 (the BAT 
used in the exposure session), 100% of participants displayed RC at post-treatment and 
85.5% displayed RC at follow-up. For BAT-1 (the generalization BAT), these values 
were 89.3% at post-treatment and 80.0% at follow-up. And on the CLQ, 43.8% of 
participants displayed RC at follow-up. On all measures, no differences were found 
between treatment groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 CLQ data were not collected at post-treatment because the CLQ is a general measure of real-world 
claustrophobia concerns, rather than claustrophobic concerns in the context of the current study. Therefore, 
we reasoned that this measure was too temporally stable to pick up any significant changes in 
claustrophobic fear immediately following treatment. 
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4.4 Moderator Analyses 
 
For each between-groups comparison, we examined whether the effect of 
treatment condition was moderated by prerandomized individual factors such as 
experiential avoidance (AAQ), tendency to suppress unwanted thoughts (WBSI), and 
emotion regulation tendencies (ERQ). 
We also investigated whether community status, degree of impairment, and 
baseline severity (CLQ and peak fear) moderated the effect of treatment condition on 
claustrophobic fear, as well as whether these factors were predictive of treatment 
response across treatment conditions. 
For all analyses, stepwise linear regression models were created in which pre-FU 
change in peak fear was the criterion variable (BAT-1 and BAT-2 were analyzed 
separately). In the first block, we included the dummy-coded condition terms. On the 
second block, we added the moderator terms (categorical moderators were centered), and 
on the third block we added the condition × moderator interaction terms. If  the 
interaction was significant, then moderation was inferred. 
Community status was found to significantly predict reductions in BAT peak fear, 
β = -24.48, t = -2.36, p < .03, such that community participants appeared to display 
smaller reductions in fear than did psychology students. However, the interaction term 
was not significant. 
For all other analyses, no main effect or interactions were found. 
 
4.5 Clinically Meaningful Differences and Statistical Power 
 
Because the present study has modest cell sizes, we investigated whether the lack 
of outcome differences could be attributed to low statistical power.   Assuming that a 
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difference of 15 units in our primary outcome measure (BAT peak fear) would be 
clinically significant, and that the variability in this measure was approximately 159, we 
determined that we aimed to detect an effect size of δ = 1.00. Using a power analysis 
software applet (Friendly, 2008), we determine that a sample size of 20 per cell would 
allow for sufficient power (.79) to detect such differences at posttreatment. Therefore, 
the current sample size allowed us to sufficient power to reject the null hypothesis that 
there are clinically meaningful differences between the different treatment conditions. 
4.6 Treatment Process Analyses 
 
4.6.1 Analytic Overview 
 
Individual growth-curve modeling (Francis, Fletcher, Stuebing, Davidson, & 
Thompson, 1991; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) was used to examine changes in theory- 
relevant process variables over the course of treatment trials. Unlike trend analysis 
strategies such as repeated measures ANOVA and MANOVA, which attempt to model 
trends in change at the group level, individual growth-curve modeling “focuses the study 
of change on interindividual differences in intraindividual change,” (Francis et al., 1991; 
p. 30). This approach can be advantageous for a number of reasons, including its 
suitability to time-series study designs, its lack of a requirement of independent 
observations, and its lower risk of Type 1 error (Francis et al., 1991; Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002). 
Our analyses proceeded according to three steps. In Step 1, we created individual 
growth curve models of the patterns of change over time in the variables of interest: fear, 
claustrophobic   threat   expectancies   (comprised   of   suffocation   and   entrapment 
 
9 SD’s for BAT peak fear measures ranged from 13.37 at pre-treatment to 22.21 at follow-up. 
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expectancies), self-efficacy, and acceptance of anxiety. This allowed us to test Process 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 (see section 2.2.3), that differential changes in fear and other process 
variables would be observed over the six treatment trials as a function of treatment 
condition. In Step 2, we evaluated the degree to which process variables served to 
mediate the relationship between exposure treatment and fear reduction (Process 
Hypothesis 3). To do so, we first tested each of these proposed mediational pathways 
separately, and then tested a combined model. In Step 3, we tested for the presence of 
mediational specificity across treatment groups (Process Hypothesis 4) by examining the 
pattern of mediational effects for each treatment condition separately. 
4.6.2 Step 1: Differential Changes in Fear and Other Process Measures as a 
Function of Treatment Condition 
All analyses were conducted using HLM version 5.05 (Raudenbush, Bryk, & 
Congdon, 2002). For each participant, a linear regression model was calculated, in which 
the relevant treatment process measure (e.g., fear) was predicted by exposure trial (1-6)10. 
These analyses yielded three parameters for each participant: (a) initial score level, which 
corresponds to the intercept term in the Level 1 model; (b) score change per trial, which 
corresponds to the linear coefficient in the Level 1 model, and (c) score change per trial 
squared11, which corresponds to the quadratic coefficient in the Level 1 model. For 
example, where fear is the dependent variable, the Level 1 model takes the form: 
FEAR = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + β2j (TRIAL)2   + rij 
 
 
 
10 Because 57 of 59 participants were able to complete the exposure procedure in 6 trials, we eliminated 
from process analyses the 2 cases who required more than 6 trials. 
11 A quadratic term was initially included for all models. If the model yielded any significant Level-2 
predictors for the Level 1 quadratic term coefficient (β2j) the term was retained. If not, the term was 
dropped.  Thus, the models of CCQ-S and AA-2 do not contain quadratic terms. 
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where: 
 
β0 is the intercept, or the expected fear rating of a participant at TRIAL = 0 
β1 is the linear change in fear from one trial to the next 
β2 is the quadratic change in fear from one trial to the next 
 
r is the error term, or the unique variance associated with each observation 
(exposure trial) 
Between-group differences in the three β parameters were analyzed in the Level 2 
models. Treatment groups were represented by dummy variables for ACC and SUP, with 
EO as the reference group. When possible, we also included the baseline value of the 
dependent measure as a covariate12. For example, where fear is the dependent variable, 
the Level 2 model takes the form: 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (DummyACC) + γ02 (DummySUP) + γ03 (FEARBL) + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + γ11 (DummyACC) + γ12 (DummySUP) + γ13 (FEARBL) + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + γ21 (DummyACC) + γ22 (DummySUP) + γ23 (FEARBL) + u2j 
where: 
 
γ0 is the intercept 
 
γ1 is the expected change in β associated with assignment to the acceptance 
condition 
γ2 is the expected change in β associated with assignment to the suppression 
condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Baseline values were obtained from the pre-treatment BAT-2. These covariates were included for all 
variables except the two Acceptance of Anxiety measures, because these data were not gathered at baseline. 
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γ3 is the expected change in β per additional unit of fear at baseline above the grand 
mean13 
uj is the error term, or the unique variance associated with each observation 
(individual participant) 
All models are displayed in Figures 4-8. Equations for all models are provided in 
Appendix C. 
Process Hypothesis 1: A significant effect of exposure condition will be observed for 
initial fear activation and fear decline during treatment. 
Hypothesis 1a: The ACC group will display significantly greater fear activation 
and between-trial fear reduction relative to the other two treatment groups (EO or SUP). 
Hypothesis 1b: The SUP group will display significantly lower fear activation and 
between-trial fear reduction relative to the other two treatment groups (EO or ACC). 
Growth curve models for fear are displayed in Figure 4. Fear declined 
significantly over the course of the six trials, b = -23.92, t(53) = -7.06, p < .001; this 
relationship was found to be significantly curvilinear, b = 1.97, t(53) = 4.55, p < .001, 
such that fear decline slopes were steeper during the first half of the treatment trials. 
Baseline14 fear predicted initial fear activation during the first treatment trial, b = 0.78, 
t(53) = 3.45, p < .01. 
Contrary to prediction, there was no significant condition effects for initial fear 
activation or fear decline during treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
13 All baseline variables were centered at the grand mean. 
14 For all process measures, baseline refers to the measure taken at pretreatment BAT using the coffin 
stimulus. Initial refers to the predicted value of that variable at treatment trial = 0. 
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Figure 4. Decline in Fear Across Exposure Trials (controlling for fear at baseline) 
 
 
 
Process Hypothesis 2: A significant effect of exposure condition will be observed for the 
putative mediators of fear reduction (self-efficacy, acceptance of anxiety, and 
suffocation/entrapment concerns) during treatment. 
Hypothesis 2a: The ACC group will display significantly greater between-trial 
improvements in self-efficacy, acceptance of anxiety, and suffocation/entrapment 
expectancies relative to the two other treatment groups (EO or SUP). 
Hypothesis 2b: The SUP group will display significantly lower between-trial 
improvements in self-efficacy, acceptance of anxiety, and suffocation/entrapment 
expectancies relative to those assigned to the EO group. 
Growth curve models for process variables are displayed in Figures 5-8. 
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Threat expectancies. Consistent with prediction, entrapment expectancies 
declined significantly across trials, b = -10.47, t(53) = -3.252 p < .01. Baseline 
entrapment expectancies predicted initial entrapment expectancies, b = 0.67, t(53) = 3.55, 
p < .01. Treatment groups did not differ on initial entrapment expectancies. Contrary to 
prediction, SUP participants displayed a significantly more rapid decrease in entrapment 
expectancies than did EO participants, b = -13.80, t(53) = -2.87, p < .01, and ACC 
participants displayed a more rapid decrease than EO participants to a degree that 
approached significance, b = -8.29, t(53) = 1.822, p < .08. Differences were also found 
for the quadratic term, such that the relationship between trial and fear was significantly 
more curvilinear (steeper early decline) for SUP participants than for EO participants, b = 
1.75, t(53) = 2.88, p < .01. 
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Figure  5.  Entrapment  expectancies  across  exposure  trials  (controlling  for  baseline 
 
entrapment expectancies) 
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Consistent with prediction, suffocation expectancies declined significantly across 
trials, b = -7.25, t(53) = -7.10, p < .001. Baseline suffocation expectancies predicted 
initial suffocation expectancies, b = 0.83, t(53) = -2.09, and change in suffocation 
expectancies, b = -0.05, t(53) = -2.09, p < .05. Treatment groups did not differ on initial 
suffocation expectancies or change in suffocation expectancies. 
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Figure 6. Suffocation expectancies across exposure trials (controlling for baseline 
suffocation expectancies) 
 
 
Coping self-efficacy increased significantly across trials, b = 15.21, t(53) = 3.09, p 
 
< .001, and this relationship was found to be curvilinear, b = -1.48, t(53) = 3.54, p < .01, 
such that increases were more rapid toward the beginning of the session. Baseline self- 
efficacy scores predicted initial self-efficacy scores, b = 0.45, t(53) = 2.64, p < .02. 
Contrary to prediction, SUP participants displayed higher ratings of initial self- 
 
efficacy than EO and ACC participants, b = 20.17, t =2.51, p < .02, and a more rapid 
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increase than EO and ACC participants at a degree approaching significance, b = -8.62, t 
 
= -0.44, p < .07. 
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Figure 7. Coping self-efficacy across exposure trials (controlling for baseline coping self- 
efficacy) 
Acceptance of anxiety. Because of the low intercorrelation of the 2 items 
measuring acceptance of anxiety measures, these items were analyzed separately. Scores 
on Acceptance of Anxiety-Item 1 (AA-1; “My anxiety does not bother me.”) were found 
to increase significantly across time, b = 0.25, t = 4.73, p < .01. Contrary to prediction, 
groups did not differ on initial scores or change over time. 
For Acceptance of Anxiety-Item 2 (AA-2; “It is bad to feel anxious.”), scores did 
not change over time. Groups did not differ on initial scores or change over time. Thus, 
this item was dropped from further analyses. 
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Figure 8. Acceptance of anxiety (item 1) across exposure trials 
 
4.6.3 Step 2: Do Process Variables Account for Reductions in Fear? 
 
Results of Step 1 indicated that over the course of the six treatment trials, fear and 
threat expectancies declined, while coping self-efficacy and acceptance of anxiety 
increased. Step 2 allowed us to test our next set of process hypotheses: 
Process  Hypothesis  3:  Process-related  variables  mediate  the  relationship  between 
exposure and fear. 
Hypothesis 3a: When modeled separately, changes in threat expectancies, coping 
self-efficacy, and acceptance of anxiety will each mediate the association between 
exposure and fear reduction. 
Hypothesis 3b: When all process measured are combined into a single model, 
acceptance  of  anxiety  will  account  for  the  greatest  proportion  of  the  mediated 
pathway between exposure and fear reduction. 
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Procedure for Testing and Measuring Mediational Pathways. 
 
Mediation refers to the indirect effect that an independent variable has on a 
dependent variable through a third variable (Figure 9). 
Mediatora-d 
 
 
 
 
a b 
 
 
 
 
 
Trial 
c 
Fear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trial c’ Fear 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Mediation. 
 
A demonstration of mediation requires the following steps (Baron & Kenny, 
 
1986): 
 
1) Regress the outcome variable (fear) on the initial variable (trial), and demonstrate 
that the initial variable is correlated with the outcome (path c’ ) 
2) Regress the putative mediator variable (e.g., self-efficacy) on the initial variable 
(trial), and demonstrate that the initial variable is correlated with the putative 
mediator (path a) 
3) Regress the outcome variable (fear) on both the putative mediator (e.g., self- 
efficacy) and the initial variable (trial), and demonstrate that 
a. the mediator is correlated with the outcome variable and (path b) 
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b. the correlation between the initial and outcome variables is 
significantly attenuated. 
For steps 1, 2, and 3a of this mediation test, we conducted regression analyses 
within the HLM 5.0 platform. In our models, all mediational links were thought to 
operate at Level 1 (exposuremediatorfear), thus termed lower level mediation 
(Kenny, Korchmaros, & Bolger, 2003)15. 
Regarding step 3b, there are a number of ways to determine the significance of 
 
the attenuation in the predictor-outcome relationship (Mackinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, 
West & Sheets, 2002). We chose to use PRODCLIN (Mackinnon, Fritz, Williams, & 
Lockwood, in press), a computer program that uses the distribution of the product of 
regression coefficients (corresponding to mediational pathways a and b) to compute 
asymmetric confidence intervals for the mediated effect (Mackinnon, 2008). This method 
is less prone to Type 1 error than are other common methods, such as the Sobel (1982) 
test (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; Pituch, Whittaker, & Stapleton, 2005). 
If the confidence interval generated by PRODCLIN did not contain 0, then a significant 
effect was inferred. 
Finally, for each test of mediation, we estimated the proportion of the effect that 
the mediator accounted for (PM) using the formula recommended by Shrout & Bolger 
(2002; as cited in Smits, Rosenfield, McDonald, & Telch, 2006). 
PM = (a × b) / c 
 
where: 
 
a is the effect of TRIAL on the mediator 
 
15 Because no level-2 predictors were included in these mediational analyses, the regression models were 
computationally identical to those obtained via ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 
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b is the effect of the mediator on FEAR 
 
c is the total effect of TRIAL on FEAR 
 
A final note on mediation testing: Some authors have stated that temporal 
precedence from predictor to mediator to outcome is necessary to establish a mediational 
relationship (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007). Within the current model, this 
requirement is fulfilled, since the mediator is measured prior to fear at each time point. 
Tests of Mediation. 
 
We were interested in four putative mediators: entrapment expectancies (CCQ-E), 
suffocation expectancies (CCQ-S), coping self-efficacy, and acceptance of anxiety (AA- 
1)16. We conducted two analyses. In the first, we tested each of our putative mediators in 
separate models. Those variables that demonstrated significant mediation in the first 
analyses were then combined into an integrated model featuring multiple mediators 
(Kenny, 2008; see Figure 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16  We did not examine acceptance of Acceptance of Anxiety-Item 2 (AA-2) because no evidence for 
pathway a (TRIALAA-2) was found in step 1 of the process analysis. 
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Figure 10. Integrated model of mediation 
 
Models of individual mediational effects. Entrapment expectancies, b = 0.50, 
t(56), = 7.82, p < .001, suffocation expectancies, b = 0.49, t(56), = 7.06, p < .001, self- 
efficacy, b = -0.44, t(56), = -5.17, p < .001, and acceptance of anxiety, b = -3.20, t(56), = 
-2.93, p < .01, were each associated with fear.  Including the mediators in the models led 
to substantial reductions in the slopes from the initial model, which did not include the 
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Trial -7.94 0.52 0.50 0.06 -5.10, -2.89 .42 Y 
Intercept 67.43 3.54      
 
Trial -7.82 0.61 0.49 0.07 -5.08, -2.67 .41 Y 
Intercept 62.43 4.01      
 
Trial 4.68 0.57 -0.44 0.08 -3.00, -1.24 .22 Y 
Intercept 65.47 2.87      
Acceptance of Anxiety 
Trial 0.27 0.03 -3.20 1.09 -1.51, -0.28 .09 Y 
Intercept 2.10 0.15      
 
mediators. Specifically, when controlling for entrapment expectancies, change in fear per 
trial was reduced from -9,38 units per trial, t(56), = -17.04, p < .001, in Step 1, to -5.28 
units per trial, t(56), = -6.38, p < .001, in Step 2. Similarly, change in fear was reduced 
when suffocation expectancies, b = -5.39, t(56) = -7.06, p < .001, self-efficacy, b = -7.42, 
t(56) = -11.07, p < .001, or acceptance of anxiety, b = -8.46, t(56) = 12.93, p < .001 were 
controlled for. To assess whether this attenuation in the trial-fear relationship was 
significant (and thus satisfied our final condition for mediation), we calculated 
confidence intervals using PRODCLIN. Finally, we computed PM values for each 
mediator. These data are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4. Mediating effects of process variables on fear—Separate models 
 
Mediator α σα β σβ CI PM 
Entrapment Expectancies 
 
Sig. 
Mediation 
 
 
Suffocation Expectancies 
 
 
Self-Efficacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. PM = proportion of the relationship mediated. CI = 95% confidence interval of the mediated effect. 
Alphas are regression coefficients for equations in which the dependent variable is the putative mediator 
(listed in the column header) and the predictor is TRIAL. Betas are regression coefficients for the mediator 
term, in which the dependent variable is FEAR and the predictors are 1) TRIAL and 2) the mediator. 
 
 
 
Thus, when considered separately, each of the four treatment process variables 
accounted for significant variance in the relationship between exposure trial and fear. 
The proportion of variance accounted for ranged from 9%, for acceptance of anxiety, to 
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Trial -7.94 0.52 0.34 0.05 -3.58, -1.88 .29 Y 
Intercept 67.43 3.54      
 
Trial -7.82 0.61 0.11 0.05 -1.60, -0.10 .09 Y 
Intercept 62.43 4.01      
 
Trial 4.68 0.57 -0.30 0.05 -2.03, -0.86 .15 Y 
Intercept 65.47 2.87      
Acceptance of Anxiety 
Trial 0.27 0.03 -2.60 0.79 -1.18, -0.28 .08 Y 
Intercept 2.10 0.15      
 
42%, for entrapment expectancies. Therefore, all four of these mediator variables were 
included in the integrated model. 
Integrated model of mediational effects. When entered simultaneously into the 
regression model, entrapment expectancies, b = 0.34, t(336), = 6.75, p < .001, suffocation 
expectancies, b = 0.11, t(336), = 2.24, p < .03, self-efficacy, b = -0.30, t(336), = -5.66, p 
< .001, and acceptance of anxiety, b = -2.60, t(336), = -3.27, p < .01,  were  each 
associated with fear. When controlling for all of these mediators, change in fear per trial 
was reduced from -9,38 units per trial, t(56), = -17.04, p < .001, in Step 1, to -3.73 units 
per trial, t(336) = -4.92, p < .001, suggesting that the inclusion of the mediators led to an 
attenuation of the relationship between trial and fear. We then calculated confidence 
intervals and PM values for each mediator. These data are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5. Mediating effects of process variables on fear—Combined model 
 
 
Mediator α σα β σβ CI PM 
Entrapment Expectancies 
Sig. 
Mediation 
 
 
Suffocation Expectancies 
 
 
Self-Efficacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. PM = proportion of the relationship mediated. CI = 95 % confidence interval of the mediated effect. 
Alphas are regression coefficients for equations in which the dependent variable is the putative mediator 
(listed in the column header) and the predictor is TRIAL. Betas are regression coefficients for the mediator 
term, in which the dependent variable is FEAR and the predictors are 1) TRIAL and 2) all putative 
mediators (listed in the column header). 
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Thus, when considered simultaneously, all four process variables accounted for 
significant variance in the relationship between exposure trial and fear. The proportion of 
variance accounted for ranged from 8%, for acceptance of anxiety, to 29%, for 
entrapment expectancies. Notably, when all four mediators were included, PM values 
were substantially reduced for suffocation expectancies (from 41% to 9%) and self- 
efficacy (from 22% to 15%). 
In summary, both of our individual and integrated models supported our 
hypothesis that fear reduction would be mediated by other process-relevant variables. 
4.6.4 Step 3: Are These Mediational Pathways Treatment-Specific? 
 
Process  hypothesis  4:  Mediational  pathways  will  vary  as  a  function  of  treatment 
condition. 
Hypothesis 4a: Among ACC participants, the relationship between exposure and 
fear will be most strongly mediated by acceptance of anxiety. 
Hypothesis 4b: Among SUP participants, the relationship between exposure and 
fear will be most strongly mediated by self-efficacy. 
Hypothesis 4c: Among EO participants, the relationship between exposure and 
fear will be most strongly mediated by threat expectancies. 
In our final analysis, we considered whether the mediational pathways identified 
in Step 2 operated differently across treatment conditions. Such  a  case,  in  which  the 
potency of Level 1 mediational processes (trialmediatorfear) is dependent upon a 
Level 2 moderator (treatment condition),  has  been  termed  multilevel  moderated 
mediation (Hofmann et al., 2007; Muller, Judd & Yzerbyt, 2005;). 
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Trial -8.52 1.08 -0.04 0.17 -2.50, 3.22 -.04 N 
Intercept 72.62 8.48      
 
Trial 0.24 0.06 -0.16 1.76 -0.89, 0.81 .00 N 
Intercept 2.21 0.36      
 
To test for multilevel moderated mediation, we utilized the same Level 1 
regression equations as we had in our integrated mediation model in Step 2. For each 
equation, however, we included treatment condition as a Level 2 predictor of each Level 
1 coefficient. We then generated the multilevel models using HLM, and tested for 
mediational  effects  separately  for  each  of  the  3  levels  of  the  treatment  condition 
variable17, following the same procedure as in Step 2. Results of these analyses are 
 
presented in Tables 6 through 8. 
 
Table 6. Mediating effects of process variables on fear—ACC participants 
 
 
Sig. 
Mediator α σα β σβ CI PM 
Entrapment Expectancies 
Mediation 
 
 
Suffocation Expectancies 
Trial -8.20 1.28 0.54 0.16 -7.57, - 
1.76 
 
.48 Y 
Intercept 63.51 9.73 
Self-Efficacy 
Trial 5.17 1.20 -0.36 0.17 -4.00, - 
0.16 
.21 Y 
Intercept 60.74 6.76 
Acceptance of Anxiety 
 
 
 
Note. PM = proportion of the relationship mediated. CI = 95 % confidence interval of the mediated effect. 
Alphas are regression coefficients for equations in which the dependent variable is the putative mediator 
(listed in the column header) and the predictor is TRIAL. Betas are regression coefficients for the mediator 
term, in which the dependent variable is FEAR and the predictors are 1) TRIAL and 2) all putative 
mediators (listed in the column header). 
 
 
 
Among  ACC  participants,  when  the  four  potential  mediator  variables  were 
included, change in fear per trial was reduced from -9.26 units per trial, t(54), = -8.04, p < 
.001, in Step 1, to -3.24 units per trial, t(324) = -3.41, p < .001, suggesting that the 
 
17 In testing the significance of mediational relationships, we obtained standard errors of α and β values for 
ACC and SUP conditions by pooling the standard errors of the reference group term and the appropriate 
experimental condition term, using the formula Sep=√[((n1-1)s12+(n2-1_s22))/(n1+n2-k)]. 
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Trial -8.60 1.09 0.20 0.18 -4.87, 1.29 .19 N 
Intercept 68.36 8.84      
 
Trial -8.34 1.29 0.15 0.17 -4.16, 1.50 .14 N 
Intercept 64.84 10.15      
 
Trial 0.34 0.07 -1.06 1.84 -1.66, 0.86 .04 N 
Intercept 2.14 0.37      
 
inclusion of the mediators led to an attenuation of the relationship between trial and fear. 
Of the four mediators, suffocation expectancies, b = 0.54, t(324), = 3.44, p < .001, and 
self-efficacy, b = -0.36, t(324), = -2.09, p < .04, were each significantly associated with 
fear, and accounted for 48% and 21% of the variance in the relationship. 
Table 7. Mediating effects of process variables on fear—SUP participants  
Sig. 
Mediator α σα β σβ CI PM 
Entrapment Expectancies 
Mediation 
 
 
Suffocation Expectancies 
 
 
Self-Efficacy  
Trial 3.83 1.21 -0.34 0.18 -3.11, 
0.00 
 
.14 N 
Intercept 73.65 7.05 
Acceptance of Anxiety 
 
 
 
Note. PM = proportion of the relationship mediated. CI = 95 % confidence interval of the mediated effect. 
Alphas are regression coefficients for equations in which the dependent variable is the putative mediator 
(listed in the column header) and the predictor is TRIAL. Betas are regression coefficients for the mediator 
term, in which the dependent variable is FEAR and the predictors are 1) TRIAL and 2) all putative 
mediators (listed in the column header). 
 
Among  SUP  participants,  when  the  four  potential  mediator  variables  were 
included, change in fear per trial was reduced from -9.08 units per trial, t(54), = -7.78, p < 
.001, in Step 1, to -4.20 units per trial, t(324) = -4.31, p < .001, suggesting that the 
inclusion of the mediators led to an attenuation of the relationship between trial and fear. 
However, none of the four mediators were significantly associated with fear, though self- 
efficacy, b = -0.34, t(324), = -1.94, p < .06, approached significance. 
Among  EO  participants,  When  controlling  for  all  four  potential  mediator 
variables, change in fear per trial was reduced from -9.76 units per trial, t(54) = -10.38, p 
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Self-Efficacy 
Trial 
 
4.90 
 
0.98 
 
-0.13 
 
0.14 
 
-2.09, 0.68 
 
.07 
 
N 
Intercept 63.27 4.78      
Acceptance of Anxiety 
Trial 0.25 0.05 -2.48 1.57 -1.49, 0.13 .06 N 
Intercept 1.97 0.25      
 
< .001, in Step 1, to -5.32 units per trial, t(54) = -7.00, p < .001. Entrapment 
expectancies, b = 0.34, t(324) were significantly associated with fear, accounting for 24% 
of the variance in the relationship. 
Table 8. Mediating effects of process variables on fear—EO participants 
 
 
Mediator α σα β σβ CI PM 
Entrapment Expectancies 
Sig. 
Mediation 
Trial -6.80 0.88 0.34 0.14 -4.37, - 
0.45 
.24 Y 
Intercept 61.47 5.99 
Suffocation Expectancies 
Trial -6.98 1.04 0.17 0.13 -.3.08, 
0.57 
 
 
.12 N 
Intercept 59.28 6.88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. PM = proportion of the relationship mediated. CI = 95 % confidence interval of the mediated effect. 
Alphas are regression coefficients for equations in which the dependent variable is the putative mediator 
(listed in the column header) and the predictor is TRIAL. Betas are regression coefficients for the mediator 
term, in which the dependent variable is FEAR and the predictors are 1) TRIAL and 2) all putative 
mediators (listed in the column header). 
 
 
 
In summary, we found that including treatment condition as a Level 2 predictor 
produced three models with differential mediational effects, thus lending support to our 
hypothesis of treatment-specific mediation. Among ACC participants, suffocation 
expectancies and self-efficacy mediated the trial-fear relationship, whereas among EO 
participants, only entrapment expectancies acted as a significant mediator. And among 
SUP participants, none of the mediational pathways were significant (though self- 
efficacy approached significance). 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
 
Our primary purpose was to investigate the ways in which emotional-acceptance 
or -suppression strategies used during exposure treatment for claustrophobia would affect 
treatment outcome and process. We hypothesized that encouraging claustrophobics to 
focus on and accept their emotional experience during exposure treatment would 
facilitate fear reduction, whereas encouraging them to suppress their emotional 
experience would inhibit fear reduction. Furthermore, we expected these differences to 
be observable both during the course of treatment itself, and at post-treatment and follow- 
up observations. Contrary to predictions, no significant differences were found between 
treatment conditions on composite, individual, or categorical indices of fear, at either 
post-treatment or one-month follow-up assessments. Thus, we were unable to reject our 
null hypothesis, that the use of these strategies leads to no appreciable effects on the level 
of fear reduction produced by exposure therapy. However, in our analyses of treatment 
process data, we determined that changes in cognitive variables mediated the relationship 
between exposure and fear reduction, and that these mediational relationships varied 
across treatment conditions. In particular, emotional suppression led to greater 
improvements in coping self-efficacy and suffocation expectancies, but these differences 
did not translate to greater fear reduction. 
5.1 Outcome Analysis 
 
Although notoriously difficult to do, interpreting a null finding essentially 
requires one to consider whether that finding is the result of a) a Type II error related to 
statistical and procedural issues that hindered internal validity, or b) a true null finding. 
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We will consider both of these possibilities, and in doing so, we will address several 
strengths and limitations of the current study. 
In evaluating the likelihood that our null finding represented a false negative, it 
bears considering whether lack of statistical power prevented the detection of treatment 
effects. Our cell sizes (n = 20, 19, and 20) were sufficient to allow detection of a 
clinically significant finding (change in fear of 15 units) at power = .79. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that power was a significant issue. 
Another potential procedural limitation was that of treatment credibility. At pre- 
treatment, the suppression condition was viewed as significantly more credible than the 
other two conditions (means by group: SUP = 85.38; ACC = 74.44; EO = 72.51). To deal 
with this potential confound, we statistically controlled for pre-treatment CEQ-Credibility 
scores in all analyses of continuous outcome variables, and we failed to find significant 
interactions with treatment condition. This suggests that credibility was unlikely to have 
influenced outcome, consistent with Devilly and Borkovec’s (2000) observation that 
expectancy has more frequently been found to correlate with outcome than has 
credibility. 
An additional procedural issue that bears discussion is that of manipulation 
strength and viability. This was assessed several ways: by measuring comprehension of 
instructions immediately prior to treatment, and by measuring emotion regulation 
strategies repeatedly, using both a single-item unidimensional scale after each treatment 
trial and a two-item scale at the end of treatment. As intended, the ACC and SUP groups 
differed  significantly  on  each  of  these  measures,  with  the  EO  group  consistently 
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producing  intermediate  scores. Thus,  it  appears  that  the  treatment  manipulation 
succeeded in producing divergent treatment groups. 
However, upon closer examination of these items (Table 2), it can be seen that the 
SUP condition tended to produce scores that were closer to the extreme scale values. On 
comprehension of instructions, a Likert scale ranging from 1= acceptance to 5 = 
suppression, the ACC mean score of 2.05 was markedly further from the endpoint than 
was the SUP mean score of 4.63. On emotion regulation strategies, a 0-100 scale, the 
ACC mean score of 33.08 was markedly further from the endpoint than was the SUP 
mean score of 87.78. Though it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions regarding these 
scores, they  could be interpreted to mean that SUP participants displayed a better 
understanding of their instructional set than did the ACC participants, and that they were 
more willing or better able to employ their assigned emotion regulation strategy. In other 
words, both manipulations may have worked, but the suppression manipulation may have 
worked more strongly. If this is the case, why might this be? 
One possibility is that our participants were unusually biased toward the use of 
suppression strategies (which may have contributed to the suppression rationale being 
seen as more credible). In the absence of normative data regarding  dispositional 
measures of emotional suppression and acceptance, this question cannot be answered 
directly, though it is possible to consider scores on related measures. Though normative 
data were unavailable for the ERQ, we examined the AAQ and the WBSI. On the AAQ, 
which measures experiential avoidance, Hayes et al. (2004) reported nonclinical mean 
scores ranging from 32.8 (s = 7.9) to 41.6 (s = 7.1). The current sample landed squarely 
within the nonclinical range, with a mean of 36.68 (s = 6.67) on that measure.  On the 
83  
WBSI, measuring thought suppression, the current sample’s mean score of 51.56, (s = 
10.11, n = 59), significantly exceeded the nonclinical means of 44.50 (s = 15.3; n = 159) ) 
reported by Muris and colleagues (1996), t(22) = 3.30, p < .001. Although researchers 
have treated emotional suppression and thought suppression as distinct phenomena, both 
represent experiential control strategies that have been associated with increased 
sympathetic arousal (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2004; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), increased 
anxiety (Feldner et al., 2003; Becker, Rinck, Roth, & Margraf, 1998), and impairments in 
functioning (Muris et al., 1996; Gross & John, 1998) and it is plausible that they are 
significantly correlated. Thus, it may be that our participants showed a predisposition 
toward suppression strategies. 
This possibility was further examined by investigating the manipulation check 
measures of the EO group. Since these participants did not receive emotion regulation 
instructions, perhaps their responses indicate some “default” favoritism toward 
suppression strategies. Yet, the data yielded only mild support for this claim. On the 
post-treatment emotion regulation measures, EO participants reported slightly greater 
attempts to control emotions (mean = 6.40) than to accept emotions (mean = 5.30), but 
they evidenced no such difference on the other two manipulation check measures. Thus, 
the evidence that the current sample was dispositionally prone to suppression is 
equivocal, at best. 
Next, we considered the possibility that our failure to find differences across 
treatment conditions resulted from the use of an insufficiently claustrophobic sample. 
Although 37 of 59 participants met full DSM-IV criteria for claustrophobia, perhaps 
these   participants—high-functioning   college   students   without   serious   comorbid 
84  
psychiatric and medical conditions—represented the less severe end of the clinical 
spectrum. Because this study was intended as an analogue for the treatment of clinically 
significant fear and anxiety, this is an important issue to address. 
The current sample’s CLQ data were compared to the clinical normative data 
published in the original CLQ validation study (Radomsky et al., 2001) and were found 
to be comparable. On the suffocation scale, the current sample produced a mean score of 
21.17 (s = 10.07), as compared with a mean of 23.8 (s = 8.40) in the published clinical 
sample. On the restriction scale, the current sample produced a mean of 27.94 (s = 9.43), 
as compared with 27.6 (s = 9.6) in the published clinical sample. Thus, it appears that the 
current sample was no more or less claustrophobic than the normative clinical sample. 
To further explore the relative severity of the current sample, we compared our 
outcome measures (BAT fear ratings and CLQ) to those obtained in a previous study by 
our research group (Powers et al., 2004), which was procedurally similar, utilized similar 
BAT stimuli, and had comparable sample characteristics and sizes (72 college students 
across 5 conditions, with cell sizes ranging from 11 to 17). When comparing clinical 
measures across these studies, we found no significant differences on our pretreatment 
measures of BAT-2, or the two CLQ subscales. However, for BAT-1 (the stand-up 
chamber, labeled BAT-2 in that study), the current participants displayed significantly 
lower levels of fear at pretreatment. These lower fear ratings may have occurred because, 
in the current study, the BAT 1 chamber was internally lit with Christmas lights (in the 
interest of employing BATs that differed significantly across sensory dimension; see 
section 3.3.2.1.1), whereas that chamber was left dark in the Powers et al. (2004) study. 
Indeed, several of our participants commented that the lights in the stand-up chamber 
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made it less frightening than the darkened “coffin” chamber (though some participants 
made comments to the opposite effect). Regardless of their explanation, these lower 
levels of baseline fear on BAT 1 may have allowed our participants less room for 
improvement, thereby detracting from our ability to detect time × group interactions. 
The previously mentioned limitations notwithstanding, we failed to find evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that that having claustrophobics actively attempt to suppress 
their emotional experience during exposure treatment would lead to less improvement. 
The rationale for this hypothesis was based on prior work suggesting that emotional 
suppression is cognitively taxing (Richards & Gross, 1999), and evidence indicating that 
cognitively demanding distractors may impede claustrophobic fear reduction during 
exposure treatment (Telch et al., 2004; Kamphuis & Telch, 2000). In the absence of 
evidence favoring this hypothesis, it bears asking: Does emotional suppression serve as a 
distractor? And is it cognitively demanding? 
The present study provides some evidence that emotional suppression serves as a 
distractor, or rather, that self-distraction is a primary means of emotional suppression. 
SUP participants reported engaging in higher levels of self-distraction than did 
participants in the other two groups, F(2) = 6.92, p < .01 (see Figure 3). Nonetheless, 
ACC and EO participants also reported considerable levels of self-distraction. As seen 
on Table 2, ACC and EO participants reported means of 5.30 and 4.70 on the self- 
distraction measure (as compared to 7.53 for SUP participants). These values roughly 
correspond to a “moderate effort” on that measure, which asked participants to rate on a 
1-9 scale their “conscious effort [made] to distract from what was going on.” Though 
SUP participants may have heavily engaged in self-distraction, ACC and EO may also 
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have been sufficiently engaged so as to cancel out any differences between treatment 
groups. That the ACC and EO groups engaged in self-distraction does not represent a 
failure of the manipulation, since our intent was to influence emotion regulation, and not 
attentional strategies.  Indeed, the inclusion of the attentional measures was exploratory 
in nature. It is clear, however, that attention and emotion regulation strategies are closely 
intertwined. Because attentional strategies have been shown to influence the efficacy of 
exposure (Sloan & Telch, 2002), the clarification of this relationship represents an 
interesting area of future research. 
Regarding the second question—was the emotional suppression strategy used in 
this study cognitively demanding?—the present study design limits us to speculation. 
One major limitation was our failure to include any index of attention or cognitive 
processing, such as a memory task,that would provide an objective measure of 
distraction. Although Richards and Gross (1999) found evidence that suppression is 
cognitively taxing, their design differed from ours in several important respects. In that 
study, participants were asked to memorize information about wounded soldiers while 
watching slides that produced “transient increases in negative emotion” (p. 132). While 
doing so, participants were instructed to suppress emotional expression, rather  than 
emotional experience. It may be that suppressing emotional expression is more 
cognitively demanding than suppressing emotional experience. Or,  emotional 
suppression attempts may only impede processes involving explicit memory, and not 
those involving implicit memory, such as emotional processing. Given the previous 
findings that a cognitively-demanding distractor impeded fear reduction in claustrophobic 
subjects  (Kamphuis  &  Telch,  2000),  it  is  likely  that  emotional  suppression,  as 
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operationalized in the current study, was simply not sufficiently cognitively demanding to 
interfere with emotional processing. 
Yet another possibility is that acceptance-based treatment augmentations are 
simply not necessary or appropriate for anxiety disorders in which the source of anxiety 
is relatively circumscribed, i.e., phobias. Part of the purported value of acceptance, along 
with its sister construct, mindfulness, is that these processes allow individuals to maintain 
contact with the present moment (Borkovec, 2002), and thereby engage with anxiety- 
provoking stimuli which they might otherwise be prone to avoid, consciously or 
habitually. As Farmer writes, “Exposure therapy requires mindfulness to the extent that 
mindfulness involves the individual’s paying attention to current experiences. Indeed, if 
clients do not attend to relevant aspects of aversive situations or their physiological 
arousal, exposure is unlikely to work” (p. 254). In exposure therapy for specific phobia, 
the client is already in sufficient contact with the aversive stimulus to allow emotional 
processing to occur, as long as she is not engaged in a cognitively demanding distraction 
task (Telch et al., 2004). Although the current study was conducted in the context of 
claustrophobia, an analogous investigation of emotion regulation strategies and exposure 
therapy could theoretically be carried out across any of the anxiety disorders. It would be 
interesting to replicate this study in the context of a disorder in which fear or anxiety is 
more diffuse, and emotional suppression more relevant, such as social phobia or panic 
disorder. 
That emotional acceptance strategies may not offer additional benefit to exposure 
per se does not necessarily diminish the value of mindfulness and acceptance-based 
treatment packages, such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 
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1999b) or Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal et al., 2002). Indeed, 
these treatment packages often make use of components that are procedurally identical to 
exposure therapy, though they may be contextualized differently. For example, ACT 
clients may be encouraged to engage in fear-provoking activities in the service of living a 
vital life in accord with their core values, rather than in the service of bringing about a 
reduction in the uncomfortable and unwanted experience of fear (Eifert & Forsyth, 2005). 
Moreover, proponents of those therapies might argue that a limitation of the current study 
is our attempt to bring about increased emotional acceptance via brief, verbal inductions. 
Nonetheless, brief acceptance inductions have been found to affect a variety of dependent 
variables under  experimental study (see Barnes-Holmes et al., 2004, for  a  review), 
including pain sensitivity (Hayes et al., 1999a), anxious responding (Eifert & Heffner, 
2003), and physiological reactivity (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006). Indeed, we based our 
instructional sets on those used in the Campbell-Sills study. Still, it may be that these 
brief acceptance inductions are far less powerful than are prolonged packages that 
conceive of acceptance as an overarching goal, toward which the therapist and client 
continuously strive. 
5.2 Treatment Process 
 
Our other central aim was to closely examine fear change over the course of 
treatment, and to consider its relationship to several cognitive variables: acceptance of 
anxiety, threat expectancies, and coping self-efficacy. To do so, we measured these 
variables at each exposure trial during treatment. HLM was used to create individual 
growth curve models of these variables, and these models were then tested for mediation 
and moderated mediation. 
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In the first step of the process analysis, fear and relevant process measures were 
modeled to test the hypotheses that emotional acceptance would lead to greater 
indications of improvement within the treatment session. In particular, we expected that 
1) the ACC condition would demonstrate greater initial fear activation and decline than 
the other two groups, while the SUP condition would demonstrate lower initial fear 
activation and decline, and 2) the ACC condition would display greater improvement in 
the cognitive variables over the course of treatment, while SUP participants would 
display reduced improvement on these variables. 
Our first hypothesis was not supported; there were no group differences in fear 
activation or change. No support was found  for our second  hypothesis, that ACC 
participants would show greater declines on the process variables. ACC outperformed 
EO solely on entrapment expectancies, and even then, to a degree that only approached 
statistical significance. On no measure did ACC outperform SUP participants. These 
results seem consistent with those of our outcome analysis, especially given the similarity 
between our process and outcome fear activation measures. Thus, it appears that the use 
of emotional acceptance during exposure conferred no additional benefit to fear reduction 
observed over the six treatment trials. 
Contrary to our prediction that emotional suppression would retard emotional 
processing and fear reduction, SUP participants displayed greater increases in self- 
efficacy, and greater reductions in suffocation expectancies, than were observed in the 
other two conditions. In light of our earlier findings that failed to support the conclusion 
that suppression is a cognitively demanding strategy, it makes sense that the SUP group 
would report greater increases in coping self-efficacy.  Because they were explicitly told 
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that maintaining self-control was important to treatment efficacy, SUP participants may 
have been more attuned to their ability “to reduce fear to a manageable level while in the 
chamber” (as the self-efficacy measure states). Sloan and Telch (2002) found that when 
participants were instructed to focus on the claustrophobic threat (e.g., suffocation) and 
pay attention to contrary evidence to it, they displayed greater decreases in threat 
expectancies over the course of treatment. In a similar fashion, SUP participants may 
have been actively evaluating their coping self-efficacy and finding evidence in its favor. 
The decrease in suffocation expectancies is more difficult to explain, but it may 
also be related to attentional differences. Perhaps attempts to suppress emotions led SUP 
participants to increased interoceptive awareness, which consequently increased the 
availability of disconfirmatory information regarding suffocation expectancies. 
Mediators of Fear Reduction During Exposure Treatment 
 
In the second step of the process analysis, we tested the effects of the putative 
mediator variables on fear reduction over the course of treatment. It was predicted that 
all four of the candidate variables would act as mediators, and that acceptance of anxiety 
would account for the greatest proportion of the relationship. The first prediction was 
supported; all four variables mediated the relationship. This builds upon our group’s 
prior finding that threat expectancies decline over the course of exposure treatment 
(Sloan and Telch, 2002), by causally linking these declines to reductions in fear. 
Moreover, it lends support to the idea that cognitive variables mediate reductions in fear 
and anxiety in CBT for anxiety disorders (Hofmann, 2004; Hofmann et al., 2007; Smits 
et al., 2006, Smits, Powers, Cho, & Telch, 2004), an idea that is central to CBT (Beck et 
al., 1979) and has been called into question by some proponents of acceptance-based 
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therapies (Hayes et al, 2004; Longmore & Worrell, 2007; see Hofmann, 2007, for a 
response). Furthermore, it provides evidence for mediation using a methodology that is 
relatively sophisticated, in its usage of individual growth curve modeling over repeated 
time points. While some investigators have used multilevel models to identify mediators 
based on data gathered at pre-treatment, post-treatment, and follow-up (e.g., Hofmann et 
al., 2007; Jones & Menzies, 2000), Smits et al. (2006) is the only other investigation, to 
our knowledge, that has used this methodology to investigate changes in mediators within 
a single treatment session. 
Moderated Mediation of Fear Reduction During Exposure Treatment 
 
An additional strength of the current study was our simultaneous consideration of 
several possible mediators. We did not find support, however, for our hypothesis that 
acceptance of anxiety would be the strongest of these mediators. Instead, the mediators’ 
relative strengths were (in declining order): entrapment expectancies, self-efficacy, 
suffocation expectancies, and acceptance of anxiety. Given our Step 1 findings that 
suppression led to greater improvements in some process variables (suffocation 
expectancies and coping self-efficacy), and our Step 2 findings, that these process 
variables mediated the relationship between exposure and fear reduction, could we 
conclude that emotional suppression led to a stronger mediational relationship than did 
the other treatment conditions? 
Step 3 of our analysis suggested that this was not the case. In testing for 
moderated mediation, we found that among SUP participants, none of the process 
variables appeared to significantly mediate the relationship. In the ACC group, however, 
the trial-fear relationship was mediated by suffocation expectancies and self-efficacy, and 
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among EO participants, the relationship was mediated by  entrapment  expectancies. 
These findings failed to support our a priori hypothesis, that acceptance would mediate 
the reduction in fear in the ACC group, coping self-efficacy would mediate the reduction 
in fear for the SUP group, and threat expectancies would mediate the reduction in fear for 
the EO group. 
In moderated mediation, the effect of the moderator (treatment condition) can 
influence the mediational relationship in two ways: via the relationship between the 
initial variable and the mediator (mediational path a), and via the relationship between 
the mediator and the outcome variable (mediational path b; Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 
2005). In this case, it appears that the use of emotional suppression leads to greater 
decreases in suffocation expectancies and increases in coping self-efficacy. These 
differences, however, do not translate to greater declines in fear, as they do for 
participants in the other two groups. Emotional suppression, while strengthening 
mediational path a (for suffocation expectancies and coping self-efficacy), may also 
inhibit mediational path b, thereby preventing differences in outcome. Such an 
interpretation is consistent with our finding that emotional suppression was not, in fact, 
cognitively demanding. Were that the case, we would expect to see SUP participants 
displaying relatively smaller improvements on threat expectancies, which would translate 
to smaller reductions in fear. 
5.3 Further Limitations 
 
In addition to those mentioned throughout the discussion, several other 
limitations merit consideration. One significant limitation regarding our process analysis 
was that we did not fully account for potentially reciprocal relationships between fear and 
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other process variables. That is to say, our mediational models were specified such that 
mediation was only analyzed within each trial. It is possible, however, that changes in 
the outcome and mediator variables at each trial affected these variables at the following 
time point. These cross-trial relationships could be brought under consideration via the 
employment of a longitudinal mediational model (MacKinnon, Fairchild & Fritz, 2007), 
such as a cross-lagged panel design (Smits et al., 2006). These newer methods of 
analysis hold promise for better understanding cognitive mediators of exposure 
treatments. 
Another limitation regarding the process analysis was our somewhat 
unsophisticated single-item measure of acceptance. Because this does not represent a 
well-validated measure, it casts some doubt on our findings, particularly the finding that 
acceptance of anxiety did not mediate fear reduction in the ACC group. Emotional 
acceptance is a difficult concept to measure via self-report, even when using instruments 
with much larger numbers of items (AAQ-16; Bond & Bunce, 2003). Moreover, most 
instruments intended to tap acceptance and the related construct, mindfulness (e.g., 
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills; Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004), seek to measure 
these constructs as traits, rather than states. Laboratory investigations of acceptance- 
based treatments could well be aided by the development and validation of brief, state- 
dependent measures of these constructs. 
Finally, there were limitations regarding our sample. Despite our efforts to recruit 
participants from the community at large, 53 of our 59 participants were university 
students, and the  mean age of  the sample  was 21.27.  Also, our participants were 
overwhelmingly female (77.97%).   Although women are overrepresented as specific 
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phobia sufferers (point prevalence of 19.9% for women and 12.4% for men; Fredrikson, 
Annas, Fischer & Wik, 2004), they seem to be overrepresented in this sample. Both of 
these factors may negatively impact the generalizability of our findings. 
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Claustrophobia Experiment 
Session 1 
Instructions 
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SUPPLIES 
1. Clipboard 
2. HR Monitor 
3. Tape Recorder and Tape 
4. Forms 
a. 2 copies of consent form 
b. Instructions packet 
c. Screening packet 1 
d. Screening packet 2 
e. Questionnaire packet 
f. Pretreatment BAT packet 
g. Treatment Data Collection packet 
h. Posttreatment BAT packet 
 
GENERAL GUIDELINES 
1. Follow the procedure on the script as closely as possible. However, unless 
indicated, it is not necessary to read the instructions exactly word for word. Try 
to keep the tone friendly and conversational. 
2. Do NOT write the participant’s name on any data collection sheets. 
3. Keep the participant out of the Claustrophobia Room except when they are doing 
the exposures. 
 
PROCEDURE 
1. GREETING, OVERVIEW OF SESSION, and CONSENT 
Hi! My name is   I am the experimenter for the Claustrophobia Study and 
I will be guiding you through today’s claustrophobia treatment session. This session 
should take about 2 hours to complete. We will also ask you to return for a follow-up 
session in one month’s time. That session should take about 30-60 minutes to 
complete. 
Before we continue, I’ll ask you to please turn your cell phone off during the 
experimental session. Thanks. 
Today’s session includes several phases. First, I will have you read a consent 
form and sign it when finished. Then I will conduct a brief interview with you, and I’ll 
also ask you to fill out some questionnaires. Next, you will put on a heart rate monitor 
and enter two different small enclosed spaces, and fill out some more questionnaires. 
This will allow us to measure how claustrophobic you are. 
Next, we will ask you to undergo a brief behavioral treatment for 
claustrophobia. This treatment has been found to be highly effective in previous 
studies conducted here in our laboratory. After the treatment, we will again ask you to 
enter two small enclosed spaces, so that we can again determine your degree of 
claustrophobia. Do you have any questions? 
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Answer any questions as briefly as you can. Hand them a clipboard with the 
consent form. 
Here is a form we need you to read and sign before we get started. It describes 
what you will be asked to do as a participant in this study. Let me know if you have any 
questions. 
After they sign the consent form, give them one copy to keep. 
Next, record the participant’s name in the Participant Log and note which group 
they are assigned to (EXP, ACC, or CON). 
 
2. DEMOGRAPHICS AND SCREENING QUESTIONAIRES 
 
READ WORD FOR WORD: 
[Confidentiality notice:] The information you will provide in the interview, and your 
answers on the questionnaires, are confidential. Only the graduate student who is the 
principal investigator for this experiment will have access to the information, and the 
data is analyzed anonymously. This means that we do not look at a particular 
individual’s answers--they are coded by number. Any questions? 
 
Have them fill out Screening Packet 1, and check their answers on items 13 and 14 to 
ensure that they meet entry criteria. If they do not answer affirmatively to either of these 
items, ask them about it, and see whether they need to change their answers. 
 
Next, ask them the questions on Screening Packet 2 (SCID for claustrophobia). 
 
At this point, asses for eligibility. If they appear not to be eligible, review their materials 
and try to ensure that this is really the case. Why did they show up for the experiment if 
they are not claustrophobic? If they truly are not eligible, then dismiss them from the 
study. (301 students who are ineligible will receive 1 HOUR credit for the session.) 
 
3. OTHER QUESTIONNAIRES 
Have them fill out the questionnaire packet. 
Next, I will ask you to fill out some additional questionnaires about topics that are not 
necessarily related to enclosed spaces. Be thorough and honest, but please don’t spend 
too much time thinking about the questions. Stick with your first reaction and mark 
that answer. Again, the information we collect here will be kept confidential. If you 
have any questions about any of the questionnaires, do not hesitate to ask me. 
 
4. HEART RATE MONITOR 
Explain to them how to use the HR monitor. Have them go into the bathroom to moisten 
the electrodes and put it on. 
 
Once they are wearing the monitor tell them to sit still for 3 minutes, so that you can get a 
“before” HR. 
--------------MONITOR: “START LAP 1” 
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Wait 3 minutes. 
--------------MONITOR: “START LAP 2” 
 
5. INITIAL ASSESSMENTS 
At this point, you and the participant should be outside the claustrophobia chamber room. 
In the room, the lights should be off, except for the night light and the lights inside the 
cabinet. 
 
Now we’re going to assess your degree of claustrophobia. In this room there are two 
small chambers, and I will ask you to enter each of them for a short period of time. 
First I am going to show you the upright chamber. 
 
A) Cabinet Exposures 
 
Enter the room and show them the chamber for about five seconds, then step back outside 
the room. Have them fill out the Pretreatment BAT packet up until it says to STOP (2 
pages). 
 
Say: 
Now, we are going to go into the room, and I will ask you to enter the upright chamber. 
When you enter the chamber, I will lock the door. However, it is important that you 
understand that you can leave the cabinet at any time if you get too uncomfortable. If 
you knock on the inside of the cabinet, I will immediately undo the lock and open the 
door. Otherwise, I will signal to you that the trial is over by opening the door. Do you 
have any questions?  [answer them as briefly as you can]. 
 
Escort the participant into the chamber. After you close the doors, 
1. Place the lock on the door, and click it shut without actually locking the door. 
2. Start timing with your stopwatch. Allow a maximum of one minute in the 
chamber. 
--------------MONITOR: “START LAP 3” 
3. Remain close to the chamber, so that the HR monitor continues to transmit to the 
stopwatch. 
 
At one minute, open the door, and push Start on the stopwatch. 
--------------MONITOR: “START LAP 4” 
 
At the conclusion of the trial (one minute, or less if the participant knocks on the cabinet), 
escort the participant outside the room. 
 
I would like you to answer some questions now related to your experience in the 
cabinet. 
 
Have them fill out the response questionnaire. 
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REPEAT THIS PROCEDURE (EXCEPT FOR SHOWING THEM THE 
CABINET) FOR THE SECOND BAT 
 
Now I will show you the other chamber. 
 
B) Chamber Exposures 
 
Enter the room and show them the chamber for about five seconds, then step back outside 
the room. Have them fill out the Pretreatment BAT packet up until it says to STOP (2 
pages). 
 
Say: 
Now, we are going to go into the room, and I will ask you to enter the other chamber. 
When you enter the chamber, I will lock the door. However, it is important that you 
understand that you can leave the chamber at any time if you get too uncomfortable. If 
you knock on the inside of the chamber, I will immediately undo the lock and open the 
door. Otherwise, I will signal to you that the trial is over by opening the door. Do you 
have any questions?  [answer them as briefly as you can]. 
 
Escort the participant into the chamber. After you close the doors, 
1. Place the lock on the door, and click it shut without actually locking the door. 
2. Start timing with your stopwatch. Allow a maximum of one minute in the 
chamber. 
--------------MONITOR: “START LAP 7” 
3. Remain close to the chamber, so that the HR monitor continues to transmit to the 
stopwatch. 
 
At one minute, open the door, and push Start on the stopwatch. 
--------------MONITOR: “START LAP 8” 
 
At the conclusion of the trial (one minute, or less if the participant knocks on the cabinet), 
escort the participant outside the room. 
 
I would like you to answer some questions now related to your experience in the 
chamber. 
 
Have them fill out the response questionnaire, and push Start on the stopwatch. 
--------------MONITOR: “START LAP 10” 
 
REPEAT THIS PROCEDURE (EXCEPT FOR SHOWING THEM THE 
CHAMBER) FOR THE SECOND BAT 
 
6. TREATMENT INTERVENTION 
 
Bring the participant into any room except the Claustrophobia Room. 
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In a few minutes we will begin the treatment portion of today’s session. I would like 
you to listen to a taped recording that will explain how our claustrophobia treatment 
works. It is very important that you pay close attention to this tape if you want to 
benefit from the treatment. If you have any questions about anything, feel free to ask 
me after the tape ends. 
 
Leave the room while the participant listens to the tape. Note whether they are listening 
to the X min tape (Exposure only group) or the X min tape (the CON and ACC groups). 
 
 
After the tape say: Do you have any questions? Answer questions as briefly as you can. 
Before we begin, I would like you to fill out one more questionnaire. 
Give them the Therapy Evaluation Form (at the beginning of the Treatment Measures 
packet). 
 
 
Next, bring the subject back to the door of the Claustrophobia Room. Have them fill out 
the CCQ and the Chamber Prediction Survey. Say: Please complete the questionnaires 
up until the STOP instructions. 
 
--------------MONITOR: “START LAP 11” 
 
 
Now we will enter the room, and I am going to open the door of the chamber. You are  
to get inside and lie down on the sanitary paper with your head on the pillow, and 
remain there as long as you can.  I will signal to you when the trial is over by opening 
the door. I would like you to try and stay for at least five minutes . In the event that you 
need to leave the chamber before the five minutes are over, simply knock on the door of 
the chamber and I will let you out. 
For ACC participants: While you are in the chamber, remember that you should try 
and allow yourself to experience fear and anxiety without trying to avoid or suppress 
those feelings. This is crucial to the success of this exercise. THE EXERCISE WILL 
BE FAR MORE EFFECTIVE IF YOU MAKE A CONSCIOUS EFFORT NOT TO 
CONTROL YOUR FEELINGS OF FEAR, AND TO ALLOW YOURSELF TO 
EXPERIENCE HEIGHTENED ANXIETY. Do you have any questions? 
For CON participants: While you are in the chamber, remember that you should do 
your best to keep yourself from feeling fear or anxiety. THE EXERCISE WILL BE 
FAR MORE EFFECTIVE IF YOU MAKE A CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO CONTROL 
YOUR FEELINGS OF FEAR, AND TO PREVENT YOURSELF FROM 
129  
EXPERIENCING HEIGHTENED ANXIETY. This is crucial to the success of this 
exercise. Do you have any questions? 
 
 
--------------MONITOR: “START LAP 12” 
Have them enter, and then close the door to the chamber all the way, Allow a maximum 
of five minutes in the chamber. 
 
 
After either the five minutes have ended or the participant has opened the door, end the 
trial. 
--------------MONITOR: “START LAP 13” 
Bring the participant outside the room and 
1) Enter the amount of time they spent in the chamber IN SECONDS. 
2) Have them fill out the reaction survey. Say: I would like you to complete the 
following questionnaires now. If you have any questions or problems please ask. 
 
Each of the following trials should be conducted in exactly the same way. It is 
acceptable not to repeat the general exposure instructions word for word, as participants 
become familiar with the procedure. However, be sure to repeat the condition-specific 
instructions thoroughly each time. 
 
 
7. POST ASSESSMENTS 
--------------MONITOR: “START LAPS 23-30” (lap numbers will be different if 
additional treatment trials were required) 
 
See Pre-Treatment Assessment instructions. The Post-Treatment Assessment should be 
procedurally identical. 
ALSO, fill out the CGI scale at the end of the Post-Treatment Assessment packet. 
 
8. GET RESTING HR 
--------------MONITOR: “START LAP 31” 
Have the participant sit down in a chair. Start a lap on the stopwatch and measure their 
HR for 3 minutes. This will be used as resting HR. 
 
9. SCHEDULE NEXT SESSION 
. 
10. DATA ENTRY 
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1. Upload HR data into Polar program 
2. Enter all data into SPSS spreadsheet 
 
REMEMBER TO TAKE BACK THE 
HEART RATE MONITOR!!! 
Please refer to Jon Horowitz for any questions about the study.  
horowitz@mail.utexas.edu 
cell: 914-2754 
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10. Treatment intervention (listen to tape) 15:00 
11. Anticipation Trial 1 3:00 
12. Trial 1 6:00 or less 
13. Anticipation Trial 2 2:00 
14. Trial 2 6:00 or less 
15. Anticipation Trial 3 2:00 
16. Trial 3 6:00 or less 
17. Anticipation Trial 4 2:00 
18. Trial 4 6:00 or less 
19. Anticipation Trial 5 2:00 
20. Trial 5 6:00 or less 
21. Anticipation Trial 6 2:00 
22. Trial 6 6:00 or less 
 
23. Instructions, anticipation BAT 1 3:00 
24. BAT 1 (cabinet) 1:00 or less 
25. Anticipation BAT 2 1:00 
26. BAT 2 (cabinet) 1:00 or less 
27. Instructions, anticipation BAT 3 3:00 
28. BAT 3 (chamber) 1:00 or less 
29. Anticipation BAT 4 1:00 
30. BAT 4 (chamber) 1:00 or less 
31. Baseline (post) HR 3:00 
 
HR Data Profile 
 
Lap Activity Approximate Length 
Number  
Pretreatment BAT’s 
1. Baseline (Pre) HR 3:00 
2. Instructions, anticipation BAT 1 3:00 
3. BAT 1 (cabinet) 1:00 or less 
4. Anticipation BAT 2 1:00 
5. BAT 2 (cabinet) 1:00 or less 
6. Instructions, anticipation BAT 3 3:00 
7. BAT 3 (chamber) 1:00 or less 
8. Anticipation BAT 4 1:00 
9. BAT 4 (chamber) 1:00 or less 
 
Treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(after this point, lap numbers may be different if additional trials are required) 
Posttreatment BAT’s 
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APPENDIX B: COLLECTED MEASURES 
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Participant  
 
Experimenter:_  Date:  Time:  
 
 
 
 
SCREENING PACKET 1 
(filled out by participant) 
 
Date of Birth_ _ 
 
Marital Status:  Single/Never married Married Widowed Divorced 
 
Gender: Male Female 
 
Age:   
 
Highest grade level completed: 
 
1 2 3 4  5 6 7  8  9 10 11 12  Some 2-Year 4-year Post-graduate 
College College College Degree 
 
Racial Categories (Check all that Apply): Ethnic Categories 
 
  _American Indian/Alaska Native 
  _Asian 
  _Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
  _Black or African American 
  _White 
  _Unknown 
  _Hispanic or Latino 
  _Not Hispanic or Latino 
 
(Race and ethnicity information is collected in compliance with National Institutes of Health Policy 
on Reporting Race and Ethnicity Data) 
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SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE I 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: We’d like to get some information from you about your anxiety. The content of 
your answers will be kept STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Thank you for your cooperation and your 
candid response to these questions. Record next to each item how ANXIOUS you would feel in 
the following places or situations. For example, if you have no fear at all of “Lying on a bottom 
bunkbed,” record “0” next to that item. If you are extremely afraid of this situations, place “4” next 
to the item. REMEMBER TO RECORD A NUMBER (and only 1 number) NEXT TO EACH ITEM. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT! 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
No fear Mild Fear Moderate Fear  Severe Fear Extreme fear 
 
1)     
2)     
3)     
4)     
5)     
6)     
7)     
8)     
9)     
10)   
11)   
 
12)   
_Locked in a small dark room without windows for 15 min 
_Head first into zipped up sleeping bag, able to leave whenever you wish 
_Locked in a small well-lit room without windows for 15 min 
_In a crowded train, which stops between stations 
_In a public washroom and the lock jams 
_In an elevator at a time when there is a strong likelihood of a power cut 
_Working under a sink for 15 minutes 
_Standing in an elevator on the ground floor with the doors closed 
_Lying on a bottom bunk bed 
_In the center of a full room row at a cinema 
_In back of a small 2-door car with a person on either side of you, and all the 
windows are fogged up 
_Waiting for 15 min in an airplane on the ground with the door closed 
 
 
13. Do you have a fear of enclosed spaces (such as elevators, caves, etc)? No Yes 
 
14. Do you avoid closed spaces, or endure them only with intense anxiety? No Yes 
15a. Have you ever undergone an MRI scan? No Yes 
IF YES: 
b. How many times have you undergone an MRI scan? _  
 
c. What was the date of your most recent MRI scan? (MM/YYYY)_ _  
 
d. Did the MRI procedure cause claustrophobic fear that was difficult to endure? 
No Yes 
 
e. Were you able to complete the MRI procedure? No Yes 
 
f. Was medication used to control your anxiety during the scan? No Yes 
 
g. IF YES: Medication_  __ h. Dose _ 
 
16a. Are you currently planning to undergo an MRI scan? No Yes 
 
b. IF YES: Scheduled date of scan  
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17. If you had to undergo an MRI scan at this time, how much fear do you think you would feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 
No fear Mild Fear Moderate Fear  Severe Fear Extreme fear 
18. How confident are you that you could undergo an MRI scan without medication? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not Confident at All        Extremely Confident 
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SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE II 
 
1. (If female) Are you currently pregnant? 
 
□No □Yes 
 
2a. Do you currently have any life-threatening medical conditions (such as seizure disorder, 
respiratory disorder, cardiovascular disease)? 
 
□No □Yes 
 
(b) IF YES, please list here: 
  _  
 
 
_ _ 
 
  _  _ _ 
 
  _  _ _ 
 
  _  _ _ 
 
  _  _ _ 
 
3a. Are you currently taking any prescription or over-the-counter medications? 
 
□No □Yes:  (b)    _  
 
  _  _  
 
4a. IN THE PAST 24 HOURS, have you taken any anti-anxiety medication (such as 
Xanax, Valium, Ativan, Klonapin)? 
□No □Yes: (b) Medication (c) Dose  
. 
5a. Have you ever received a diagnosis of schizophrenia, paranoid or other psychotic disorder, 
organic mental disorder, or bipolar disorder? 
 
□No □Yes: (b) Diagnosis  
 
YOU HAVE COMPLETED THIS PACKET.  PLEASE INFORM THE 
EXPERIMENTER THAT YOU ARE READY TO CONTINUE. 
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SCREENING PACKET 2 
(filled out by experimenter) 
 
 
Participant  
 
Experimenter:_  Date:  Time:_  
 
 
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
 
1. Between 18-65: YES NO 
 
2. Currently pregnant YES NO 
 
3. Life-threatening medical condition YES NO 
 
4. Serious psychiatric diagnosis YES NO 
 
 
 
Met inclusion criteria? (All boldfaced must be circled for person to participate) 
 
YES NO (excluded) 
 
 
 
SCID Claus. Diagnosis (except criterion E) YES NO 
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Pretreatment Assessment BAT Packet 
 
 
 
 
Date  
 
Participant number  
 
Experimenter Initials  
 
 
BAT 1: UPRIGHT CHAMBER 
 
 
Instructions: Listed below are statements reflecting common concerns about being in enclosed 
spaces. If you were to enter the chamber, how concerned would you be by each of the following? 
 
1. I might be trapped 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
2. I might run out of air 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
3. I might not be able to escape if I had to 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
4. I might have difficulty breathing 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
5. Estimate your confidence in being able to reduce your fear to a manageable level while 
in the chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence  Extreme 
Confidence 
 
6. Estimate your confidence in being able to remain in control of your actions while in the 
chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence  Extreme 
Confidence 
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Prediction Survey 
 
1. Estimate your EXPECTED LEVEL OF PEAK FEAR if you were to enter the 
chamber for 5 minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
2. Estimate your CONFIDENCE THAT YOU COULD remain in the chamber for 5 
minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Confidence 
Confidence 
 
Mild Confidence 
 
Moderate Confidence 
 
Strong Confidence 
  
Extreme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
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Reaction Survey 
 
 
1. What was the HIGHEST level of fear you experienced while in the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
 
2. What was the level of fear you experienced IMMEDIATELY BEFORE exiting 
the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For experimenter: 
 
Time _ 
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BAT 2: UPRIGHT CHAMBER 
Prediction Survey 
 
1. Estimate your EXPECTED LEVEL OF PEAK FEAR if you were to enter the 
chamber for 5 minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
2. Estimate your CONFIDENCE THAT YOU COULD remain in the chamber for 5 
minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Confidence 
Confidence 
 
Mild Confidence 
 
Moderate Confidence 
 
Strong Confidence 
  
Extreme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
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Reaction Survey 
 
 
1. What was the HIGHEST level of fear you experienced while in the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
 
2. What was the level of fear you experienced IMMEDIATELY BEFORE exiting 
the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
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For experimenter: 
 
Time _ 
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BAT 3: COFFIN 
 
 
Instructions: Listed below are statements reflecting common concerns about being in enclosed 
spaces. If you were to enter the chamber, how concerned would you be by each of the following? 
 
1. I might be trapped 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
2. I might run out of air 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
3. I might not be able to escape if I had to 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
4. I might have difficulty breathing 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
5. Estimate your confidence in being able to reduce your fear to a manageable level while 
in the chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence  Extreme 
Confidence 
 
6. Estimate your confidence in being able to remain in control of your actions while in the 
chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence  Extreme 
Confidence 
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Prediction Survey 
 
1. Estimate your EXPECTED LEVEL OF PEAK FEAR if you were to enter the 
chamber for 5 minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
2. Estimate your CONFIDENCE THAT YOU COULD remain in the chamber for 5 
minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Confidence 
Confidence 
 
Mild Confidence 
 
Moderate Confidence 
 
Strong Confidence 
  
Extreme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
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Reaction Survey 
 
 
1. What was the HIGHEST level of fear you experienced while in the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
 
2. What was the level of fear you experienced IMMEDIATELY BEFORE exiting 
the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For experimenter: 
 
Time _ 
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BAT 4: COFFIN  
 
Prediction Survey 
 
 
1. Estimate your EXPECTED LEVEL OF PEAK FEAR if you were to enter the 
chamber for 5 minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
2. Estimate your CONFIDENCE THAT YOU COULD remain in the chamber for 5 
minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Confidence 
Confidence 
 
Mild Confidence 
 
Moderate Confidence 
 
Strong Confidence 
  
Extreme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
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Reaction Survey 
 
 
1. What was the HIGHEST level of fear you experienced while in the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
 
2. What was the level of fear you experienced IMMEDIATELY BEFORE exiting 
the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
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For experimenter: 
 
Time _ 
150  
 
Clinical Global Impression Scale for Claustrophobia (CGIS-C) 
 
This is to be filled out by the experimenter at the end of the session 
 
Global Claustrophobia Symptoms 
Considering your total clinical experience with this population, 
how severe are the patient’s symptoms of claustrophobia at this time? 
1. normal (not at all ill) 
2. borderline menatally ill 
3. mildly ill 
4. moderately ill 
5. markedly ill 
6. severely ill 
7. extremely ill 
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Date  
 
 
Participant Number  
 
 
Experimenter Initials  
 
 
 
 
 
Pretreatment Questionnaire Packet 
 
Thank you for choosing to take part in our study. We greatly appreciate your 
truthfulness in responding to these questionnaires. The information you provide 
will help us understand the fear of enclosed spaces (claustrophobia). 
 
Please answer these questionnaires truthfully and thoroughly. Do not spend too 
much time deciding about which answers are most accurate. If you are unsure, just 
go with your first instinct. 
 
All the information you provide will be kept confidential. Only the experimenter 
will have access to it. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to ask the 
experimenter. 
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1 2 3 4 5  6  7 
never very seldom seldom sometimes frequently  almost always  always 
true true true true true  true  true 
 
I am able to take action on a problem even if I am 
uncertain what is the right thing to do.
 1
 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
When I feel depressed or anxious, I am unable to 
take care of my responsibilities.
 1
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
I try to suppress thoughts and feelings that I don’t 
like by just not thinking about them.
 1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It’s okay to feel depressed or anxious. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I rarely worry about getting my anxieties, worries, 
and feelings under control.
 1
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
In order for me to do something important, I have 
to have all my doubts worked out.
 1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I’m not afraid of my feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I try hard to avoid feeling depressed or anxious. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Anxiety is bad. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Despite doubts, I feel as though I can set a course in 
my life and then stick to it.
 1
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
If I could magically remove all the painful 
experiences I’ve had in my life, I would do so.
 1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am in control of my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If I get bored with a task, I can still complete it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Worries can get in the way of my success. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I should act according to my feelings at the time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If I promised to do something, I’ll do it, even if I 
later don’t feel like it.
 1
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
I often catch myself daydreaming about things I’ve 
done and what I would do differently next time.
 1
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
When I evaluate something negatively, I usually 
recognize that this is just a reaction, not an objective 1 
fact. 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
When I compare myself to other people, it seems 
that most of them are handling their lives better than 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ 19) 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by circling a 
number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
4. 
5. 
 
6. 
 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
 
11. 
 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
 
17. 
 
18. 
 
 
 
19. 
 
I do. 
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White Bear Supression Inventory (WBSI) 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with each of the following items using the scale 
below. Simply circle your response to each item. 
 
1 2 3 4  5  
strongly 
disagree 
disagree somewhat neither agree 
nor disagree 
agree 
somewhat 
 strongly 
agree 
1. There are things I prefer not to think about. 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
2. Sometimes I wonder why I have the thoughts I do. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I have thoughts that I cannot stop. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. There are images that come to mind that I cannot 1 erase. 
2 3 4 5 
5. My thoughts frequently return to one idea. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. I wish I could stop thinking of certain things. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Sometimes my mind races so fast I wish I could 1 stop it. 
2 3 4 5 
8. I always try to put problems out of mind. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. There are thoughts that keep jumping into my 1 
head. 
2 3 4 5 
10. Sometimes I stay busy just to keep thoughts from 1 intruding on my mind. 
2 3 4 5 
11. There are things that I try not to think about. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Sometimes I really wish I could stop thinking. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I often do things to distract myself from my 1 thoughts. 
2 3 4 5 
14. I often have thoughts that I try to avoid. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. There are many thoughts that I have that I don’t 1 tell anyone. 
2 3 4 5 
 
Copyright (1994) by Blackwell Publishing Company. Reprinted with permission of the publisher. 
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Claustrophobia Questionnaire 
 
How anxious would you feel in these places or situations? Circle the most appropriate 
response. 
 
1. Swimming while wearing a nose plug 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
2. Working under a sink for 15 min 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
3. Standing in an elevator on the ground floor with the doors closed 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
4. Trying to catch your breath during vigorous exercise 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
5. Having a bad cold and finding it difficult to breathe through your nose 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
6. Snorkeling in a safe practice tank for 15 min 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
7. Using an oxygen mask 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
8. Lying on a bottom bunk bed 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
9. Standing in the middle of the third row at a packed concert realizing that you will 
be unable to leave until the end 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
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10. In the center of a full row at a cinema 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
11. Working under a car for 15 min 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
12. At the furthest point from an exit on a tour of an underground mine shaft 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
13. Lying in a sauna for 15 min 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
14. Waiting for 15 min in a plane on the ground with the door closed 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious 
 
(RS) 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
15. Locked in a small DARK room without windows for 15 min 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
16. Locked in a small WELL-LIT room without windows for 15 min 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
17. Handcuffed for 15 min 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
18. Tied up with hands behind your back for 15 min 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
19. Caught in tight clothing and unable to remove it 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
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Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
20. Standing for 15 min in a straitjacket 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
 
 
21. Lying in a tight sleeping bag enclosing legs and arms, tied at the neck, unable to 
get out for 15 min 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
22. Head first into a zipped up sleeping bag, able to leave whenever you wish 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
23. Lying in the trunk of a car with air flowing through freely for 15 min 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
24. Having your legs tied to an immovable chair 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
25. In a public washroom and the lock jams 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
 
26. In a crowded train which stops between stations 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious 
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Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) 
 
We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how 
you control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. The questions below involve 
two distinct aspects of your emotional life. One is your emotional experience, or what 
you feel like inside. The other is your emotional expression, or how you show your 
emotions in the way you talk, gesture, or behave. Although some of the following 
questions may seem similar to one another, they differ in important ways. For each item, 
please answer using the following scale: 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6--------------7 
strongly neutral strongly 
disagree  agree 
 
1.    
 
 
2.    
3.    
 
 
4.    
5.    
 
 
6.    
7.    
 
 
8.    
9.    
10.    
When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I 
change what I’m thinking about. 
I keep my emotions to myself. 
When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change 
what I’m thinking about. 
When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them. 
When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way 
that helps me stay calm. 
I control my emotions by not expressing them. 
When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking 
about the situation. 
I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in. 
When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them. 
When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking 
about the situations. 
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TIPI 
 
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please write a 
number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with 
that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if 
one characteristic applies more strongly than the other. 
 
1 = Disagree strongly 
2 = Disagree moderately 
3 = Disagree a little 
4 = Neither agree nor disagree 
5 = Agree a little 
6 = Agree moderately 
7 = Agree strongly 
 
I see myself as: 
 
1.   
2.   
3.   
4.   
5.   
6.   
7.   
8.   
9.   
10.    
Extraverted, enthusiastic. 
Critical, quarrelsome. 
Dependable, self-disciplined. 
Anxious, easily upset. 
Open to new experiences, complex. 
Reserved, quiet. 
Sympathetic, warm. 
Disorganized, careless. 
Calm, emotionally stable. 
Conventional, uncreative. 
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CQ 
 
1. How confident are you that you can perform courageous behaviors, when necessary? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all  A little   Moderately   Very much  Extremely 
 
2. How likely is it that you will be able to act courageously, when necessary? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all  A little   Moderately   Very much  Extremely 
 
3. How confident are you that you will be able to face your fears, when necessary? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all  A little   Moderately   Very much  Extremely 
 
4. How confident are you that you will be able to confront new fearful situations that pose no real 
threat? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all  A little   Moderately   Very much  Extremely 
 
5. How important is it to you that you act courageously, when the situation calls for it? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all  A little   Moderately   Very much  Extremely 
 
6. How bothered are you by situations where the outcome is uncertain? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all  A little   Moderately   Very much  Extremely 
 
7. How threatened do you feel by the feelings and sensations of anxiety? (e.g., heart racing, muscle 
tension, increased breathing) 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all  A little   Moderately   Very much  Extremely 
 
8. How relaxed do you feel right now? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all  A little   Moderately   Very much  Extremely 
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DTS 
 
Directions: Think of times that you feel distressed or upset. Select the response for each 
item that best describes your beliefs about feeling distressed or upset. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Mildly agree Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
Mildly disagree Strongly 
disagree 
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1. Feeling distressed or upset is unbearable to me. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. When I feel distressed or upset, all I can think about is how bad I feel. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I can’t handle feeling distressed or upset. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. My feelings of distress are so intense that they completely take over. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. There’s nothing worse than feeling distressed or upset. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. I can tolerate being distressed or upset as well as most people. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. My feelings of distress or being upset are not acceptable. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. I’ll do anything to avoid feeling distressed or upset. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Other people seem to be able to tolerate feeling distressed or upset 
better than I can. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Being distressed or upset is always a major ordeal for me. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. I am ashamed of myself when I feel distressed or upset. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. My feelings of distress or being upset scare me. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I'll do anything to stop feeling distressed or upset. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. When I feel distressed or upset, I must do something about it 
immediately. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. When I feel distressed or upset, I cannot help but concentrate on how 
bad the distress actually feels. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Treatment Data Collection Packet 
 
 
 
 
Date  
 
Participant number  
 
Experimenter Initials  
 
 
Exposure Sessions 
(This form is intended to help keep track of time remaining during the exposure session. 
Except for posttreatment HR, it is not entered into the data set.) 
 
Trial 
 
1 
Exp. Time  Tot. Time Elapsed 
 
2 
   
 
3 
   
 
4 
   
 
5 
   
 
6 
   
 
(7) 
 
  
  
 
(8) 
 
  
  
 
(9) 
 
  
  
 
(10) 
 
  
  
 
(11) 
 
  
  
 
(12) 
 
  
  
 
(13) 
 
  
  
 
(14) 
 
  
  
 
Post-treatment resting HR (take after all exposures done)   
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Therapy evaluation form 
We would like you to indicate below how much you believe, right now, that the  
therapy you are receiving will help to reduce your anxiety. Belief usually has two 
aspects to it: (1) what one thinks will happen and (2) what one feels will happen. 
Sometimes these are similar; sometimes they are different. Please answer the questions 
below. In the first set, answer in terms of what you think. In the second set, answer in 
terms of what you really and truly feel. We do not want the experimenter to ever see these 
ratings, so please keep the sheet covered and turn the page when you are done. 
 
Set I 
 
1. At this point, how logical does the therapy offered to you seem? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
not at all logical somewhat logical  very logical 
 
2. At this point, how successfully do you think this treatment will be in reducing your 
phobia symptoms? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
not at all useful somewhat useful  very useful 
 
3. How confident would you be in recommending this treatment to a friend who 
experiences similar problems? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
not at all confident somewhat confident  very confident 
 
4. By the end of the therapy period, how much improvement in your phobia 
symptoms do you think will occur? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
Set II 
For this set, close your eyes for a few moments, and try to identify what you really feel 
about the therapy and its likely success. Then answer the following questions. 
 
1. At this point, how much do you really feel that therapy will help you to reduce your 
phobia symptoms? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
not at all   somewhat   Very much 
 
2. By the end of the therapy period, how much improvement in your phobia 
symptoms do you really feel will occur? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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Set III 
 
Based on the instructions you received, please answer the following questions. 
 
1. During the procedure, I should try to control my emotions as much as possible 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree  Neither  Agree 
  Agree nor   
  Disagree   
 
2. The procedure will work better if I allow myself to feel whatever feelings I have 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree  Neither  Agree 
  Agree nor   
  Disagree   
 
 
 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the experimenter. 
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(Before trial 1) 
Claustrophobic Concerns Questionnaire (CCQ) 
 
Instructions: Listed below are statements reflecting common concerns about being in enclosed 
spaces. If you were to enter the chamber, how concerned would you be by each of the following? 
 
1. I might be trapped 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
2. I might run out of air 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
3. I might not be able to escape if I had to 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
4. I might have difficulty breathing 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
5. Estimate your confidence in being able to reduce your fear to a manageable level while 
in the chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence  Extreme 
Confidence 
 
6. Estimate your confidence in being able to remain in control of your actions while in the 
chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence Extreme 
Confidence   
7. My anxiety does not bother me 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly 
Disagree Somewhat nor Disagree Somewhat Agree 
8. It is bad to feel anxious 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly 
Disagree Somewhat nor Disagree Somewhat Agree 
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Pretreatment Prediction Survey 
 
1. Estimate your EXPECTED LEVEL OF PEAK FEAR if you were to enter the 
chamber for 5 minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
2. Estimate your CONFIDENCE THAT YOU COULD remain in the chamber for 5 
minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Confidence 
Confidence 
 
Mild Confidence 
 
Moderate Confidence 
 
Strong Confidence 
  
Extreme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
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Trial 1. Chamber Reaction Survey 
1. What was the level of fear you experienced upon ENTERING the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
2. What was the level of fear you experienced upon EXITING the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
3. What was the HIGHEST level of fear you experienced while in the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
4. While I was in the chamber, I made a CONSCIOUS EFFORT to… 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100        
Allow my emotions 
control of 
to run their course 
emotions 
  (Neither)    Stay in 
 
my 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
 
 
 
For experimenter: 
 
Time  
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(Before trial 2) 
Claustrophobic Concerns Questionnaire (CCQ) 
 
Instructions: Listed below are statements reflecting common concerns about being in enclosed 
spaces. If you were to enter the chamber, how concerned would you be by each of the following? 
 
1. I might be trapped 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
2. I might run out of air 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
3. I might not be able to escape if I had to 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
4. I might have difficulty breathing 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
5. Estimate your confidence in being able to reduce your fear to a manageable level while 
in the chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence  Extreme 
Confidence 
 
6. Estimate your confidence in being able to remain in control of your actions while in the 
chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence  Extreme 
Confidence 
 
7. My anxiety does not bother me 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree  Agree Strongly 
Disagree Somewhat nor Disagree Somewhat Agree 
 
8. It is bad to feel anxious 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly 
Disagree Somewhat nor Disagree Somewhat Agree 
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Pretreatment Prediction Survey 
 
1. Estimate your EXPECTED LEVEL OF PEAK FEAR if you were to enter the 
chamber for 5 minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
2. Estimate your CONFIDENCE THAT YOU COULD remain in the chamber for 5 
minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Confidence 
Confidence 
 
Mild Confidence 
 
Moderate Confidence 
 
Strong Confidence 
  
Extreme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
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Trial 2. Chamber Reaction Survey 
1. What was the level of fear you experienced upon ENTERING the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
2. What was the level of fear you experienced upon EXITING the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
3. What was the HIGHEST level of fear you experienced while in the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
4. While I was in the chamber, I made a CONSCIOUS EFFORT to… 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100        
Allow my emotions 
control of 
to run their course 
emotions 
  (Neither)    Stay in 
 
my 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
 
 
 
For experimenter: 
 
Time  
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(Before trial 3) 
Claustrophobic Concerns Questionnaire (CCQ) 
 
Instructions: Listed below are statements reflecting common concerns about being in enclosed 
spaces. If you were to enter the chamber, how concerned would you be by each of the following? 
 
1. I might be trapped 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
2. I might run out of air 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
3. I might not be able to escape if I had to 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
4. I might have difficulty breathing 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
5. Estimate your confidence in being able to reduce your fear to a manageable level while 
in the chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence  Extreme 
Confidence 
 
6. Estimate your confidence in being able to remain in control of your actions while in the 
chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence  Extreme 
Confidence 
 
7. My anxiety does not bother me 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree  Agree Strongly 
Disagree Somewhat nor Disagree Somewhat Agree 
 
8. It is bad to feel anxious 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly 
Disagree Somewhat nor Disagree Somewhat Agree 
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Pretreatment Prediction Survey 
 
1. Estimate your EXPECTED LEVEL OF PEAK FEAR if you were to enter the 
chamber for 5 minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
2. Estimate your CONFIDENCE THAT YOU COULD remain in the chamber for 5 
minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Confidence 
Confidence 
 
Mild Confidence 
 
Moderate Confidence 
 
Strong Confidence 
  
Extreme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
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Trial 3. Chamber Reaction Survey 
1. What was the level of fear you experienced upon ENTERING the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
2. What was the level of fear you experienced upon EXITING the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
3. What was the HIGHEST level of fear you experienced while in the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
4. While I was in the chamber, I made a CONSCIOUS EFFORT to… 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100        
Allow my emotions 
control of 
to run their course 
emotions 
  (Neither)    Stay in 
 
my 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
 
 
 
For experimenter: 
 
Time  
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(Before trial 4) 
Claustrophobic Concerns Questionnaire (CCQ) 
 
Instructions: Listed below are statements reflecting common concerns about being in enclosed 
spaces. If you were to enter the chamber, how concerned would you be by each of the following? 
 
1. I might be trapped 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
2. I might run out of air 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
3. I might not be able to escape if I had to 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
4. I might have difficulty breathing 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
5. Estimate your confidence in being able to reduce your fear to a manageable level while 
in the chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence  Extreme 
Confidence 
 
6. Estimate your confidence in being able to remain in control of your actions while in the 
chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence  Extreme 
Confidence 
 
7. My anxiety does not bother me 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree  Agree Strongly 
Disagree Somewhat nor Disagree Somewhat Agree 
 
8. It is bad to feel anxious 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly 
Disagree Somewhat nor Disagree Somewhat Agree 
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Pretreatment Prediction Survey 
 
1. Estimate your EXPECTED LEVEL OF PEAK FEAR if you were to enter the 
chamber for 5 minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
2. Estimate your CONFIDENCE THAT YOU COULD remain in the chamber for 5 
minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Confidence 
Confidence 
 
Mild Confidence 
 
Moderate Confidence 
 
Strong Confidence 
  
Extreme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
177  
Trial 4. Chamber Reaction Survey 
1. What was the level of fear you experienced upon ENTERING the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
2. What was the level of fear you experienced upon EXITING the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
3. What was the HIGHEST level of fear you experienced while in the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
4. While I was in the chamber, I made a CONSCIOUS EFFORT to… 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100        
Allow my emotions 
control of 
to run their course 
emotions 
  (Neither)    Stay in 
 
my 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
 
 
 
For experimenter: 
 
Time  
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(Before trial 5) 
Claustrophobic Concerns Questionnaire (CCQ) 
 
Instructions: Listed below are statements reflecting common concerns about being in enclosed 
spaces. If you were to enter the chamber, how concerned would you be by each of the following? 
 
1. I might be trapped 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
2. I might run out of air 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
3. I might not be able to escape if I had to 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
4. I might have difficulty breathing 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
5. Estimate your confidence in being able to reduce your fear to a manageable level while 
in the chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence  Extreme 
Confidence 
 
6. Estimate your confidence in being able to remain in control of your actions while in the 
chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence  Extreme 
Confidence 
 
7. My anxiety does not bother me 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree  Agree Strongly 
Disagree Somewhat nor Disagree Somewhat Agree 
 
8. It is bad to feel anxious 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly 
Disagree Somewhat nor Disagree Somewhat Agree 
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Pretreatment Prediction Survey 
 
1. Estimate your EXPECTED LEVEL OF PEAK FEAR if you were to enter the 
chamber for 5 minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
2. Estimate your CONFIDENCE THAT YOU COULD remain in the chamber for 5 
minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Confidence 
Confidence 
 
Mild Confidence 
 
Moderate Confidence 
 
Strong Confidence 
  
Extreme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
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Trial 5. Chamber Reaction Survey 
1. What was the level of fear you experienced upon ENTERING the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
2. What was the level of fear you experienced upon EXITING the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
3. What was the HIGHEST level of fear you experienced while in the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
4. While I was in the chamber, I made a CONSCIOUS EFFORT to… 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100        
Allow my emotions 
control of 
to run their course 
emotions 
  (Neither)    Stay in 
 
my 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
 
 
 
For experimenter: 
 
Time  
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(Before trial 6) 
Claustrophobic Concerns Questionnaire (CCQ) 
 
Instructions: Listed below are statements reflecting common concerns about being in enclosed 
spaces. If you were to enter the chamber, how concerned would you be by each of the following? 
 
1. I might be trapped 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
2. I might run out of air 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
3. I might not be able to escape if I had to 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
4. I might have difficulty breathing 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No concern Mild concern Moderate Concern Strong Concern  Extreme Concern 
5. Estimate your confidence in being able to reduce your fear to a manageable level while 
in the chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence  Extreme 
Confidence 
 
6. Estimate your confidence in being able to remain in control of your actions while in the 
chamber 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No confidence  Mild confidence Moderate Confidence Strong Confidence  Extreme 
Confidence 
 
7. My anxiety does not bother me 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree  Agree Strongly 
Disagree Somewhat nor Disagree Somewhat Agree 
 
8. It is bad to feel anxious 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly 
Disagree Somewhat nor Disagree Somewhat Agree 
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Pretreatment Prediction Survey 
 
1. Estimate your EXPECTED LEVEL OF PEAK FEAR if you were to enter the 
chamber for 5 minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Fear 
Extreme Fear 
 
Mild Fear 
  
Moderate Fear 
  
Severe Fear 
 
 
2. Estimate your CONFIDENCE THAT YOU COULD remain in the chamber for 5 
minutes Circle one number: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100 
No Confidence 
Confidence 
 
Mild Confidence 
 
Moderate Confidence 
 
Strong Confidence 
  
Extreme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
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Trial 6. Chamber Reaction Survey 
1. What was the level of fear you experienced upon ENTERING the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
2. What was the level of fear you experienced upon EXITING the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
3. What was the HIGHEST level of fear you experienced while in the chamber? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100       
No Fear Mild Fear  Moderate Fear  Severe Fear  
Extreme Fear       
 
4. While I was in the chamber, I made a CONSCIOUS EFFORT to… 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
100        
Allow my emotions 
control of 
to run their course 
emotions 
  (Neither)    Stay in 
 
my 
 
 
Please STOP and await instructions from the 
experimenter. 
 
 
 
For experimenter: 
 
Time  
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
   Moderately    Very 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
   Moderately    Very 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
   Moderately    Very 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
   Moderately    Very 
 
Coping Strategies Questionnaire 
While in the chamber, how much of a conscious effort did you make to DISTRACT yourself from 
what was going on? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
No effort    Moderate effort    Strong effort 
If you tried to distract yourself from what was going on, how SUCCESSFUL were you? 
1 
Totally 
Successful Successful Successful 
 
While in the chamber, how much of a conscious effort did you make to PAY ATTENTION to what 
was going on? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
No effort    Moderate effort    Strong effort 
If you tried to pay attention to what was going on, how SUCCESSFUL were you? 
1 
Totally 
Successful Successful Successful 
 
While in the chamber, how much of a conscious effort did you make to CONTROL YOUR FEAR 
AND ANXIETY? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
No effort    Moderate effort    Strong effort 
If you tried to control your fear and anxiety, how SUCCESSFUL were you? 
1 
Totally 
Successful Successful Successful 
 
 
While in the chamber, how much of a conscious effort did you make to ACCEPT YOUR FEAR 
AND ANXIETY? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
No effort    Moderate effort    Strong effort 
If you tried to accept your fear and anxiety, how SUCCESSFUL were you? 
1 
Totally 
Successful Successful Successful 
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APPENDIX C: EQUATIONS 
FOR HLM ANALYSES 
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Step 1: Modeling Process Variables Across Exposure Trials 
 
 
1A. IV: Session  
 DV: Fear 
 
Level 1: 
 
 
FEAR = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + β2j (TRIAL)2  + rij 
 Level 2:  
 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (DummyACC) + γ02 (DummySUP) + γ03 (FEARBL) + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + γ11 (DummyACC) + γ12 (DummySUP) + γ13 (FEARBL) + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + γ21 (DummyACC) + γ22 (DummySUP) + γ23 (FEARBL) + u2j 
 
1B. IV: Session 
DV: Entrapment Expectancies 
 
Level 1: ENT_EXP = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + β2j (TRIAL)2  + rij 
Level 2: 
 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (DummyACC) + γ02 (DummySUP) + γ03 (ENT_EXPBL) + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + γ11 (DummyACC) + γ12 (DummySUP) + γ13 (ENT_EXPBL) + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + γ21 (DummyACC) + γ22 (DummySUP) + γ23 (ENT_EXPBL) + u2j 
 
1C. IV: Session 
DV: Suffocation Expectancies 
 
Level 1: SUFF_EXP = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + rij 
 
Level 2: 
 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (DummyACC) + γ02 (DummySUP) + γ03 (SUFF_EXP BL) + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + γ11 (DummyACC) + γ12 (DummySUP) + γ13 (SUFF_EXPBL) + u1j 
(Quadratic term was dropped because quadratic coefficient was not found to be 
significant.) 
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1D. IV: Session 
DV: Coping Self-Efficacy 
 
Level 1: SELF_EFF = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + β2j (TRIAL)2  + rij 
Level 2: 
 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (DummyACC) + γ02 (DummySUP) + γ03 (SELF_EFF BL) + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + γ11 (DummyACC) + γ12 (DummySUP) + γ13 (SELF_EFF BL) + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + γ21 (DummyACC) + γ22 (DummySUP) + γ23 (SELF_EFF BL) + u2j 
 
1E. IV: Session 
DV: Acceptance of Anxiety—Item 1 
 
Level 1: ACCANX1 = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + β2j (TRIAL)2  + rij 
Level 2: 
 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (DummyACC) + γ02 (DummySUP) + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + γ11 (DummyACC) + γ12 (DummySUP) + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + γ21 (DummyACC) + γ22 (DummySUP) + u2j 
Step 2: Do Process Variables Account for Reductions in Fear? 
Path c’: FEAR = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + rij 
Paths a: ENT_EXP = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + rij 
SUFF_EXP = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + rij 
SELF_EFF = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + rij 
ACCANX1 = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + rij 
Paths b (individual models): 
 
FEAR = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + β2j (ENT_EXP) + rij 
 
FEAR = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + β2j (SUFF_EXP) + rij 
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FEAR = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + β2j (SELF_EFF) + rij 
 
FEAR = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + β2j (ACCANX1) + rij 
 
Paths b (combined model): 
 
FEAR = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + β1j (ENT_EXP) + β2j (SUFF_EXP) 
 
+ β3j (SELF_EFF) + β4j (ACCANX1) + rij 
 
 
 
4.6.4 Step 3: Are These Mediational Pathways Treatment-Specific? 
Path c’: 
Level 1: FEAR = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + rij 
 
Level 2: 
 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (DummyACC) + γ02 (DummySUP) + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + γ11 (DummyACC) + γ12 (DummySUP) + u1j 
 
 
Paths a: 
 
Level 1: ENT_EXP = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + rij 
SUFF_EXP = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + rij 
SELF_EFF = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + rij 
ACCANX1 = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + rij 
Level 2 (for all Level 1 models): 
 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (DummyACC) + γ02 (DummySUP) + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + γ11 (DummyACC) + γ12 (DummySUP) + u1j 
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Paths b: 
 
FEAR = β0 j + β1j (TRIAL) + β1j (ENT_EXP) + β2j (SUFF_EXP) 
 
+ β3j (SELF_EFF) + β4j (ACCANX1) + rij 
 
Level 2: 
 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (DummyACC) + γ02 (DummySUP)  
β1j = γ10 + γ11 (DummyACC) + γ12 (DummySUP) + u1j 
β2j = γ00 + γ01 (DummyACC) + γ02 (DummySUP) + u2j 
β3j = γ10 + γ11 (DummyACC) + γ12 (DummySUP) + u3j 
β4j = γ00 + γ01 (DummyACC) + γ02 (DummySUP) 
 
Because of our relatively limited sample size, we were unable to produce a model 
including random effects for all Level 2 equations. We first chose to omit the random 
effect for the intercept term, and were able to run the model. We then examined the 
significance of all random effects, and found that the error term for β4j, u4j, was not 
significant. We therefore omitted this term and re-ran the model. 
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APPENDIX D: TREATMENT-SPECIFIC RATIONALE SCRIPTS 
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ACC GROUP SCRIPT 
 
Welcome to the Claustrophobia Treatment project at the University of Texas. This study is 
designed to better understand how confronting one’s fears can lead to reductions in fear, and it is one of 
many research projects we have conducted that aim to improve our already powerful treatments for 
phobias. 
For several decades now, psychologists have been studying the fear response in humans and 
animals, and we have learned a great deal about fear and how people can best deal with it. Fear is a 
powerful emotion. And it should be, since mother nature designed the fear response to protect us. When 
we are scared, we feel strong bodily sensations, such as sweaty palms, shortness of breath, and a racing 
heart. These bodily reactions serve a purpose: to prepare us to flee from a dangerous situation. In our 
evolutionary past, this was often helpful, because life-threatening situations were far more common. And 
our fearful reactions can still be helpful, when a real danger is present. However, the fear response can be a 
problem when there is no real danger. For example, when you have claustrophobia and you enter a small 
space, your brain sends signals to your body to prepare for imminent danger—even though no real danger 
exists. 
Fortunately, this automatic fear response can be reduced and extinguished through exposure 
therapy. In exposure therapy, you repeatedly enter into a non-dangerous but fear-provoking situation, until 
the fear naturally begins to subside. As you continue to activate the physiological fear response without 
any negative consequences, your brain will start to turn off that fear. This reduction in fear is very well- 
established principle of behavior, and it can be seen to occur in all people, and even in all animals. To put 
it simply, if you confront the feared situation repeatedly, your fear will reduce until you no longer feel 
frightened at all. 
In a few minutes, we will begin the therapy. You will be asked to enter a small chamber and 
remain there for several minutes at a time. By repeatedly entering the chamber and remaining there until 
the fear response subsides, you will essentially be training your brain and body not to respond fearfully to 
entering enclosed spaces. Since this exercise is frightening but not at all dangerous, your automatic fear 
response will soon subside, and you will be able to enter small spaces without feeling frightened or 
anxious. 
During the treatment, you will be likely to experience some feelings of fear and anxiety. The 
way that you deal with these feelings can have a big effect on how well the treatment works. 
Most people report that entering the chamber is distressing and produces emotions like anxiety 
and fear. And, many people also think that their negative emotions must be controlled or stopped. They 
may have learned from an early age, that they can and should control negative thoughts and feelings. 
People are told things like “just stop worrying” or “put it behind you”. Moreover, you see people 
controlling their feelings on many occasions, such as at funerals or in crisis situations, and you may come 
to believe that people should always try to control their emotions. 
In some cases you can control your feelings. If you are feeling too cold in your house you can 
turn up the heat. If you are feeling uncomfortable in a chair you can stand up and move around. Certain 
actions can be taken to control our inner experiences. In the same way, emotional control can sometimes 
work in temporary ways. Distraction, for example, can help you feel less pain while you’re in a dentist’s 
chair. 
However, it is often not so easy to control or stop emotions like anxiety, sadness, anger, or fear. 
Just think of how difficult it is to follow through on another person’s suggestion to “just calm down” or 
“just relax” when you are feeling upset. It’s not as easy as it sounds, right? 
Given that you have experienced some difficulty with emotions like anxiety or fear, efforts to 
block these feelings are quite understandable. However, although self-control may work in many areas of 
your life, there are situations involving emotions where sefl-control might be difficult or even impossible. 
Struggling against relatively natural emotions can actually intensify and prolong your distress, rather than 
making the situation better. Moreover, if you try to suppress your emotions and are unable to do so, this 
may lead to feelings of failure, guilt, or lack of control. Finally, your efforts to block out negative emotions 
may become a constant battle, draining you of energy and happiness. 
So, am I suggesting that you just give up on changing your emotional experiences? No, what I’m 
suggesting is that there is an alternative to struggling or battling with your emotions and it is called 
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acceptance. Accepting your emotions means that you are willing to experience them fully and that you 
don’t try to control or change your emotions in any way. 
Am I proposing that you should just put up with discomfort and distress? No, what I’m 
suggesting is that you can come to think about your emotions in a different way; not as something that 
always needs to be contained or controlled in order for you to be OK, but as natural reactions that occur, 
peak, and fade without leading to any awful consequences and without you having to struggle or fight with 
your feelings at all. 
Accepting emotions like anxiety and sadness may be difficult, especially when common sense  
tells you that these emotions are bad. There are times in life, however, when our common-sense reactions 
get us into trouble. Have you ever driven your car on a sheet of ice and lost control? Usually, the mistake 
people make is that they try to correct the situation by turning in the opposite direction from which they are 
skidding. This seems to make sense, but the more effective approach is to do the opposite – to turn the 
wheel into the direction of the skidding. 
What I am suggesting is that dealing effectively with your emotions may be very similar. It is 
against your natural reaction to allow yourself to feel negative feelings. However, just like turning into the 
direction of the skidding is a better way of dealing with icy road conditions, leaning into your emotions and 
fully experiencing them may be a better way of dealing with emotional situations. 
So, if emotions occur while you are in the machine, try to give up the struggle to suppress or 
control them. Allow yourself to accept and stay with your emotions without trying to get rid of them.  Pay 
close attention to the physical feelings of anxiety: racing heart, shortness of breath, and sweaty palms. 
Whenever you notice these sensations, just allow them to come and go. .Refrain from attempts to distract 
yourself or otherwise lessen your feelings, and instead allow yourself to feel your emotions as fully as 
possible. Just let your emotions run their natural course and see how that goes. 
The more you allow yourself to fully experience your emotions, the more 
effective the treatment will be. The treatment will begin shortly. Thank you for your participation in 
this study, and best of luck conquering your claustrophobia. Please tell the experimenter that you are ready 
to proceed. 
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SUP GROUP SCRIPT 
Welcome to the Claustrophobia Treatment project at the University of Texas. This study is 
designed to better understand how confronting one’s fears can lead to reductions in fear, and it is one of 
many research projects we have conducted that aim to improve our already powerful treatments for 
phobias. 
For several decades now, psychologists have been studying the fear response in humans and 
animals, and we have learned a great deal about fear and how people can best deal with it. Fear is a 
powerful emotion. And it should be, since mother nature designed the fear response to protect us. When 
we are scared, we feel strong bodily sensations, such as sweaty palms, shortness of breath, and a racing 
heart. These bodily reactions serve a purpose: to prepare us to flee from a dangerous situation. In our 
evolutionary past, this was often helpful, because life-threatening situations were far more common. And 
our fearful reactions can still be helpful, when a real danger is present. However, the fear response can be a 
problem when there is no real danger. For example, when you have claustrophobia and you enter a small 
space, your brain sends signals to your body to prepare for imminent danger—even though no real danger 
exists. 
Fortunately, this automatic fear response can be reduced and extinguished through exposure 
therapy. In exposure therapy, you repeatedly enter into a non-dangerous but fear-provoking situation, until 
the fear naturally begins to subside. As you continue to activate the physiological fear response without 
any negative consequences, your brain will start to turn off that fear. This reduction in fear is very well- 
established principle of behavior, and it can be seen to occur in all people, and even in all animals. To put 
it simply, if you confront the feared situation repeatedly, your fear will reduce until you no longer feel 
frightened at all. 
In a few minutes, we will begin the therapy. You will be asked to enter a small chamber and 
remain there for several minutes at a time. By repeatedly entering the chamber and remaining there until 
the fear response subsides, you will essentially be training your brain and body not to respond fearfully to 
entering enclosed spaces. Since this exercise is frightening but not at all dangerous, your automatic fear 
response will soon subside, and you will be able to enter small spaces without feeling frightened or 
anxious. 
During the treatment, you will be likely to experience some feelings of fear and anxiety. The 
way that you deal with these feelings can have a big effect on how well the treatment works. 
Most people report entering the machine is distressing and produces emotions like anxiety and 
fear. In addition, many people do not do anything to try to control their emotional reactions, which makes 
the experience even more distressing. Although experiencing anxiety and other negative emotions is 
normal when entering the machine, it is possible to experience these emotions at lower levels if you really 
concentrate on controlling them. 
There is a great deal of evidence that people can control their emotional reactions. You see people 
controlling their emotions all of the time, such as at funerals or in crisis situations where it is important to 
remain calm. There are many cases in which you can do simple things to control your feelings. If you are 
feeling too cold in your house you can turn up the heat. If you are feeling uncomfortable in a chair you can 
stand up and move around. Certain actions can be taken to control our inner experiences. In the same way, 
emotional control can often work to change our experiences. For example, distraction can help you feel  
less pain while you are in a dentist’s chair. 
Think of it – we have all sorts of phrases in our language that refer to people controlling their own 
emotional experiences. We often tell people to “calm down” when they are feeling anxious or angry. We 
use phrases such as “grin and bear it” or “put it behind you” to convey that it is possible to make it through 
a difficult experience if you are able to control your emotions. In challenging situations, people are 
frequently able to do things that help them bring their emotions down to a more manageable level. 
Given that you have experienced some difficulty with emotions like anxiety or sadness, it is 
understandable that you would consider suppressing your emotional reactions to be a difficult task. 
However, think of other areas in your life where you have been capable of self-control. If you are like most 
people, you do not feel like jumping right out of bed when your alarm clock goes off in the morning. But 
many times in your life you have gotten out of bed and prepared yourself for school, work, or other 
obligations. Initially, you may have had negative feelings like fatigue or disappointment over having to get 
up, but you battled those feelings successfully and started your day. 
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I’m sure there are other times in your life when you have not allowed your feelings to take control. 
For instance, you might think of a time when you forced yourself to go to the gym despite feeling tired or 
made yourself study for an important test even though you would have preferred to relax. Although self- 
control can be hard at first, when you are successful you feel proud of yourself -- like you have 
accomplished something important. The same is true of controlling your negative emotions. When you 
succeed at keeping your feelings under control, you feel proud of yourself for coping effectively with an 
emotional situation. However, when you just let your negative emotions run their own course and they 
intensify, you may end up feeling discouraged, guilty, or out of control. 
So, what exactly am I suggesting here? Basically, I am suggesting that you have more control 
over your emotional reactions than you think. You can exert control over the occurrence and intensity of 
your emotional states and you probably have done so successfully in the past. Although many emotions 
fade away after a while, you should not have to put up with more discomfort and distress than is necessary. 
Rather than just allowing your feelings to run their own course, I would like you to really test out 
your ability to control your emotional reactions. Whenever you experience emotions like anxiety or fear 
while you are in the machine, please try to control them as much as possible. Pay close attention to the 
physical feelings of anxiety: racing heart, shortness of breath, and sweaty palms. Do your best to control 
these physical symptoms of anxiety. Try not to show what you are feeling, and attempt to minimize the 
amount of anxiety and other emotions you feel in response to the situation. See just how much control you 
can exert over your own distress and discomfort. 
And remember, the treatment will be more effective the more you can control your strong 
emotions during this session. The treatment will begin shortly. Thank you for your participation in this 
study, and best of luck conquering your claustrophobia. Please tell the experimenter that you are ready to 
proceed. 
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EO GROUP SCRIPT 
Welcome to the Claustrophobia Treatment project at the University of Texas. This study is 
designed to better understand how confronting one’s fears can lead to reductions in fear, and it is one of 
many research projects we have conducted that aim to improve our already powerful treatments for 
phobias. 
For several decades now, psychologists have been studying the fear response in humans and 
animals, and we have learned a great deal about fear and how people can best deal with it. Fear is a 
powerful emotion. And it should be, since mother nature designed the fear response to protect us. When 
we are scared, we feel strong bodily sensations, such as sweaty palms, shortness of breath, and a racing 
heart. These bodily reactions serve a purpose: to prepare us to flee from a dangerous situation. In our 
evolutionary past, this was often helpful, because life-threatening situations were far more common. And 
our fearful reactions can still be helpful, when a real danger is present. However, the fear response can be a 
problem when there is no real danger. For example, when you have claustrophobia and you enter a small 
space, your brain sends signals to your body to prepare for imminent danger—even though no real danger 
exists. 
Fortunately, this automatic fear response can be reduced and extinguished through exposure 
therapy. In exposure therapy, you repeatedly enter into a non-dangerous but fear-provoking situation, until 
the fear naturally begins to subside. As you continue to activate the physiological fear response without 
any negative consequences, your brain will start to turn off that fear. This reduction in fear is very well- 
established principle of behavior, and it can be seen to occur in all people, and even in all animals. To put 
it simply, if you confront the feared situation repeatedly, your fear will reduce until you no longer feel 
frightened at all. 
In a few minutes, we will begin the therapy. You will be asked to enter a small chamber and 
remain there for several minutes at a time. By repeatedly entering the chamber and remaining there until 
the fear response subsides, you will essentially be training your brain and body not to respond fearfully to 
entering enclosed spaces. Since this exercise is frightening but not at all dangerous, your automatic fear 
response will soon subside, and you will be able to enter small spaces without feeling frightened or 
anxious. 
The treatment will begin shortly. Thank you for your participation in this study, and best of luck 
conquering your claustrophobia. Please tell the experimenter that you are ready to proceed. 
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